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Abstract 
To understand civil conflict and ways to resolve it in Africa, it is worthwhile to 
make an assessment of the factors which prolong conflicts. In line with theories of civil 
conflict, this thesis proceeds from the point of view that it is not a single factor but rather 
a multiplicity of factor , domestic as well as external, economic as well as political, which 
explain why civil conflict is prolonged. This thesis first surveys the causes of civil 
conflict in the region, and then proceeds to identify the multiplicity of factors which often 
prolong such civil conflict by detailing the reasons for the protracted civil wars in 
Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Among the explanatory factors are: internal and 
external economic interests in the natural resources of these countries, lack of democracy, 
poor governance, and excessive corruption that often leads to the neglect of the masses. 
In doing so, it expands the prevailing literature which tends to focus only on the causes of 
conflict. Finally, a look at Botswana, Africa’s most successful democracy, shows that 
civil conflict can be avoided through the implementation of policies of structural 
prevention.  These include poverty eradication policies, equal access to education and 
health, careful management of resources, support for economic development, and 
participation in political processes and decision making across the country. 
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CHAPTER 1 
RATIONALE FOR THIS STUDY 
 
Armed conflict within and between nations has had disastrous humanitarian 
consequences not only in Africa, but throughout the globe. A series of works on civil 
conflict reveal that Africa is ensnared in civil strife and has experienced more conflicts 
than any other continent in the world.  In-fact, “more than two-thirds of the countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa have experienced civil conflict since 1960, resulting in millions of 
deaths and monumental human suffering.’’1 Yash Tandon adds that there have actually 
been more than thirty wars fought in Africa since the 1970s, mostly internal rather than 
interstate wars.2 
United Nations peace keeping forces have spent more time in Africa than 
anywhere else in the world. Protracted civil conflict in African countries has for a long 
time been on the agenda of the international community. Scholars, conflict management 
practitioners, diplomats and politicians of every persuasion have for some time been 
preoccupied with the issue of conflicts in Africa with the overarching goal of finding 
solutions to the conflicts.   
These conflicts have devastated the African populations, destroyed political 
institutions and economies and undermined development. The complex nature of such 
conflicts which emanate from a multiplicity of factors have made them extremely 
difficult to resolve and in some cases states that had emerged from conflict have relapsed 
                                                 
1 Marshall B. Burke and Edward Miguel, et al, “Warming Increased the Risk of Civil War in Africa,”  
Robert W. Kates, ed., (New York:  New York University Paper, 2009), p. 1.  
2 Yash Tandon “Root Causes of Peacelessness and Approach to Peace in Africa,” Journal of Peace Research, 
 vol. 25, 2000, p. 166-187.   
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into war. The same complexities have forced the international community to rethink the 
methods of conflict prevention and resolution.  
Eghosa Osaghae states that “Africa has the reputation of being the world's leading 
theatre of conflict, war, poverty, disease and instability, with many scholars of conflict 
regarding the continent as a major laboratory for experimentation and theory building.” 3  
The end of colonialism and demise of the cold war did not help in minimizing civil strife 
in many African countries. The brutal civil wars and their vicious circle of violence 
experienced in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Somalia, Liberia and Sudan and many others, including the 
horrific genocide in Rwanda are among the chilling reminders of the terrible situation on 
the continent. These brutal conflicts have undermined any potential for socio-economic 
development and progress in Africa.  
During the course of such conflicts, innocent people, women and children lose 
their lives. The 1998 Report of the UN Secretary General confirms that the consequences 
of conflict on the African continent have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to prosper. 
Importantly, the issue today is not about just protecting states and allies as in the past, it 
is now an issue of defending humanity.4  Even for those countries believed to be at peace, 
there are no assurances for peace and stability. As observed by Porter, countries such as 
Ghana, Zambia and Benin which have for long periods of time been regarded as stable, 
have shown some symptoms of instability.5 The case of Zimbabwe, a country which was 
                                                 
3Eghosa Osaghae and Gillian Robinson, “Introduction to Researching Conflict in Africa: Insights and Experiences,’’ 
Elizabeth Porter, ed., (New York: United Nations University Press, 2005), p. 1. 
4UN Secretary General, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development 
in Africa” (report  presented to the 58th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, New York,1998), 
A/52/871-S/1998/318, p.  13.  
5Eghosa Osaghae and Gillian Robinson, Researching Conflict in Africa, p. 2.  
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among those most respected for its political and economic stability and considered the 
bread-basket of Southern Africa, is another example of disappointment for Africa. 
President Mugabe who became the Head of State since independence from Britain in 
1980 is today the longest serving President and has done everything at his disposal to 
cling to power, including of election rigging, and suppression of those with dissenting 
voices, within and outside his ZANU-PF political party. A nation that was once known 
for success with an educated and self-sufficient population, is now experiencing record 
unemployment rates, with many educated Zimbabweans crossing into neighboring states 
such as Botswana, Namibia and South Africa for greener pastures.   Similarly, the 2007 
upheaval in Kenya, during which violent ethnic killings occurred following that country's 
general elections, also raised the concerns of many political analysts and researchers. The 
situation of Kenya alarmed the international community because the country had always 
been considered among the African emerging democracies with a growing market 
economy. 6 Even though order was restored before the violence escalated into a war, the 
episode which occurred in Kenya sent shivers up the spines of world leaders as such a 
situation was never expected in that peaceful country. The country is also deeply divided 
along tribal lines and political parties are based on ethnicity. 
Paul Collier observes that while civil war declined over the years in other regions 
of the world, this was not the case in Africa, where the incidents of civil conflicts have 
increased.7 Since the 1970s, over thirty wars, mostly civil intra-state in origin, have taken 
                                                 
6Michael Chege, “Kenya: Back from the Brink,” Journal for Democracy, vol. 19, no.4, 2008, p. 125-139. 
7Paul Collier, “Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: Crimes of War, War in Africa,” (paper presented in Crimes 
of War Project, www.crimesofwar.org, 2004).  
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place in Africa and at least 14 out of 53 countries on the Continent have been afflicted by 
armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war related deaths worldwide. 8   
In this thesis I will define civil conflict as a disequilibrium among socio-
economic, political, cultural, military and legal factors which often leads individuals or 
groups to clash over interests, values and goals within a state.  I will use Angola, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone as points for analysis of the factors contributing to civil conflict. In this 
regard, I will attempt to establish whether there are any commonalities regarding the 
factors which prolonged civil conflicts in these countries. If there are common factors 
that prolong conflict in these three countries, then it would mean that there are specific 
factors that we ought to effectively deal with in order to minimize civil conflict and bring 
long-lasting peace to African countries.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8UN Secretary General, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development 
in Africa” (Report presented to the 58th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, New York, September 
2004).  
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND LITERATURE 
 
Research Design 
 A multiplicity of factors have contributed to the outbreak of hostilities in many 
African countries. However, there are some factors which have played a significant role 
in prolonging conflict and making conflict resolution in the region extremely difficult. I 
hypothesize that the factors that prolong conflict in Africa need to be dealt with as a 
matter of prerequisite for conflict prevention and resolution in Africa and that in order to 
avoid the prolongation of civil conflict, underlying key economic, political, social and 
cultural problems need to be resolved. This is based on the assumption that the 
disequilibrium among these factors is fundamentally responsible for the outbreak of 
hostilities in the first place, as individuals and groups fight over the control of resources, 
inequalities, differential treatment of communities, and political power, among other 
things.  
In this thesis, I will first discuss the impact of civil conflict on countries that go 
through it. This will then be followed by an analysis of internal and external factors 
which are purported in the literature to be sources of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. 
By selecting Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone as my case studies I wish to establish 
whether or not there are consistencies in the factors that prolonged conflict in those 
countries. I selected these countries for both their similarities and differences. One 
important common factor among the three countries is the level of brutal atrocities 
broadly committed by both governments and opposition and the nature and complexity of 
the conflicts. The countries are also rich in minerals with potential for wealth. In addition, 
10 
 
Liberia provides an important perspective because it was never colonized compared to 
the two other countries, while Sierra Leone is a country that comparatively started very 
well as a democracy, with strong institutions with good investment in provision of good 
education of its people. Angola is above all the most resourced country compared to the 
two, with not only diamonds but also oil and with potential to be one of the richest 
countries in Africa, if resources are well managed. To repeat, the aim here is to determine 
if there are any common factors which prolonged wars in these states and how best 
conflict prevention and resolution can be effective on the continent.  
Definition of civil conflict 
It is important at this juncture to define civil conflict.  Paraphrasing Quincy 
Wright, Richard Barringer posits that peace is a condition of equilibrium among 
numerous factors which include military, legal, social, political, economic, technological, 
and psychic factors. Conversely, Barringer argues that war is then the result of serious 
disturbances in this equilibrium.1  Ida Mukenge in Zones of Conflict in Africa, defines 
civil conflict as “disagreement between domestic actors-government and private groups-
over issues that may be economic, political, social, cultural, or any combinations of 
these.”2  Rasheed Draman adds that conflict is an interaction between interdependent 
people who perceive incompatible goals and who expect interference from the other party 
if they attempt to attain their goal.3When the achievement of their goal is threatened, then 
conflict emerges.  
 
                                                 
1 Richard E. Barringer, “War: Patterns of Conflict,”The Journal of Politics, vol 35, no. 2, 1973, pp. 526 – 528.  
2Ida R. Mukenge, Introduction to Zones of Conflict in Africa, p. 3. 
3  Rasheed Draman, “ Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship, ” (paper  presented for 
Experts Group Meeting on Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Program,  Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 19-23, 
May 2003), p. 4.  
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Theory and Literature: 
In their excellent work on Zones of Conflict in Africa, George Kieh and Idah 
Mukenge outline three theories of civil conflict.4 Although these are not specifically 
about the prolongation of conflict they are useful because we first need to understand 
factors that lead to civil conflicts before determining those that actually prolong it.  
Primordial Theory 
The Primordial Theory of conflict stems from the point of view that conflict usually 
arises in a situation where there is co-existence of people of different belief systems. As a 
result of the myths, beliefs, culture and customs of these groups, there develops some sort 
of hatred and resentment between the people of the different cultures. Some of those who 
have worked on Premordial Theory of conflict are of the view that primordial causes are 
innate and cannot be changed.  
Kieh asserts that the basic tenet of the primordial theory of civil conflict is that 
conflict emanates from social existence.5  Adding to this Randall Hagardon states that  
“cultural differences between groups-sustained by powerful origin stories, historical 
narratives, religious symbols and imagined primordial ties to one’s own ancestral spirits 
are forever present, robust and resilient.”6    Kieh and Mukenge identify clan, ethnic 
group, and racial group as the main primordial groups. In investigating the root causes of 
civil conflict in Africa, and focusing on Liberia, DR Congo, Burundi and others, Abiero 
Mpondo confirms that indeed ethnicity, race, sovereignty, language and culture are 
                                                 
4George Kieh, Jr, “Theories of Conflict and Conflict Resolution,” in  George Kieh et al, ed., Zones of Conflict in 
Africa: Theories and Cases, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), p.12. 
 
5 George Kieh, Jr,. Theories of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, p. 10.  
6Randall Hagardon, “Biographical Memoir of Clifford Geertz: 23 August 1926 – 30 October 2006,” Proceedings of 
American Philosophical Society, vol. 154, no.1, 2010, p. 88. 
12 
 
primordial, involving similar practices, initiations, beliefs and linguistic features that pass 
from one generation to another and somehow are a biological organism and cannot be 
changed.7   
Quoting Beverly Crawford, Bojana Blagojevic also expresses the view that the 
primordialist approach is based on “ancient hatreds among ethnic and cultural groups: 
the urge to define and reject the other goes back to our remotest human ancestors and 
indeed beyond them to our animal predecessors.”8 In this work, Blakojevic informs that 
these ancient hatreds which are based on ethnicity and cultural differences set the stage 
for a situation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ as also confirmed by Opondo,  who says that 
primordials are declarations of exclusive zones for “us” and “them.” They pose a danger 
because they are “exclusivist and isolationist,” becoming tragic once they are invoked for 
political and economic objectives.9   
What is important however is that some of the writers who have scrutinized the 
primordial theory are not convinced that the co-existence of people of different ethnic, 
religious, and cultural groups should bring conflict. While the theory of constructivism 
is explored at length elsewhere in the thesis, it is important to note here that the 
shortcomings of primordial theory are exposed largely by constructivism which 
challenges the assumption that such concepts are a given.  Constructivists believe that 
socially constructed conceptualizations can be changed and that rapid and radical 
change is possible. According to constructivists, concepts are what we human beings 
                                                 
7Abiero Opondo, “Ethnicity: A Cause of Political Instability in Africa?” (Paper presented at a lecture at Kigali 
Institute of Education, Rwanda, January 2003),p. 1 – 2.   
 
8 Bojana Blagojevic, “Causes of Ethnic Conflict: A Conceptual Framework,” Journal of Globa Governance, vol. 3, 
no.1, 2009, p. 5.  
9Abiero Opondo, Ethnicity: A Cause of Political Instability in Africa?, p.  1-2.  
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make of them by attaching meanings to them through the use of language and through 
our values. As such ethnicity and religion are socially constructed. Blagojevic adds, 
“while ethnic emotions appear to be primordial, they are socially and politically 
constructed reality drawn from the historical memories of past injuries and grievances 
and they are created through teaching, repetition and daily reproduction until they 
become common sense.’’10 
For the constructivists, ethnicity should not be seen as a matter of nature because 
common ancestry and myths are socially and culturally constructed and not given.11 
Therefore ethnicity, religion, customs, and culture are not fixed and cannot be a cause 
of conflict per se. To this extent, conflict and competition within a society and 
between societies can be avoided and customs and cultures can be realigned with the 
view to accommodate each other and ensure communities live side by side in peace 
and harmony. 
Be that as it may, understanding the primordialist approach, as stated by 
Blagojevic, helps the researcher of conflict to understand the role of emotions in 
conflict.12  
 Class Theory: 
The class theory of civil conflict has its basis in Marxism. Marxists view class 
relations as the main factor affecting the economic and political order and state that class 
struggle occurs because of capitalism. Marxists argue that private ownership of the means 
of production and the distribution of goods, reflected in a free competitive market 
motivated by profit making are the pillars of capitalism which cause competition within a 
                                                 
10 Bojana Blagojevic, Causes of Ethnic Conflict, p. 6.  
11
Pamela Paglia, Ethnicity and Tribalism, p. 11. 
12Bojana Blagojevic, Causes of Ethnic Conflict, p. 6.  
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society. In this private ownership of means of production those that own production 
employ those who do not own, hence the owners become richer and richer, while those 
that do not own become servants of the owners of production, therefore, causing friction 
between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots.’ This form of relationship leads to conflict between 
the rich and those that are poor. In a nutshell, the capitalist mode of production, is 
exploitative in nature and ushers in hierarchically organized societies where the dominant 
class (those with private ownership) determines the direction of society at the expense of 
the weaker. 13  
Marxists maintain that capitalism maximizes class interests and does not produce 
welfare for all. The distribution of wealth is based on social class and the powerful 
classes accumulate more wealth at the expense of the poor, making conflict within a 
society inevitable. Conflict then occurs when “the deprived group, nation or individuals 
attempt to increase their share of power and wealth or to modify the dominant values, 
norms, beliefs or ideology.”14Theodore Cohn asserts that Marxists and/or structuralists 
view economic relations as basically conflictual and that common to this conflict is the 
exploitation of the weaker “out group” by the dominant “in-group”: “private owners (the 
haves) extract surplus value from wage laborers (the have-nots).”15  
In this system of class divisions, political conflict becomes acute. Both the “haves” and 
the “have-nots” are aware of their status and while the former attempts to continue the 
status quo, the latter fights to overcome the oppression by the dominant class.    Kieh and 
Mukenge observe that, “within African states, there are pockets of opulence, amidst a 
                                                 
13Theodore H. Cohn, Global Political Economy, (New York: Pearson Longman, 2008), p.99.  
14Ajibogun Olatubosun, “Causes of Conflicts in the 21st Century Africa,” June 2009, p.3.  
15 Ajibogun Olatubosun , Ibid.  
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growing poverty and mass misery.”16  
The primordial and class theories are relevant to the study of civil conflict and 
provide very useful insights on the set up of societies and reveal some factors such as 
ethnicity, culture, religion, and unbalanced distribution of wealth that can cause friction 
and escalate into conflict when disadvantages brought by them are not addressed in good 
time.  
Eclectic Theory:  
The basic tenet of eclectic theory is that the source of civil conflict emanates from a 
multiplicity of factors as opposed to a single cause or factor.  All aspects, social, cultural, 
political or economic, are relevant in a civil conflict.17 Kieh and Mukenge observe that 
with the exception of Djibouti, a multiplicity of factors have caused wars in all countries 
which have experienced civil conflict in Africa.18 In-fact that it is these multiplicity of 
factors that have made conflict prevention and resolution even more complex. Among 
factors they consider are the colonial legacy in Africa and the impact of ideological war.  
The work and findings of Richard Barringer appear to have influenced the 
findings of Kieh and Mukenge. In his book, War, Patterns of Conflict,   Barringer argues 
for multiple causation of war, noting that “any explanation of armed conflict in terms of a 
single factor represents a gross oversimplification that is likely to lead to ill-conceived 
policy action.”19  In his analysis, Barringer asserts that there are patterns of factors which 
condition the origin, development and the termination of conflict and that these 
                                                 
16George Kieh, Jr, Theories of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, p.12.  
17George Kieh, Jr, Theories of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, p. 12. 
18 George Kieh, Jr, Theories of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, ibid. 
19Richard E. Barringer, War, Patterns of Conflict, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972), p. 5. 
16 
 
conditions are at once, social, political, economic, technological, military and 
psychological.20  
Ali and Matthews are among those authors who consider multiple factors. Their 
addition to this thesis is that in their book, Civil Wars in Africa, they absolve external 
actors of the blame for civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. Although they do concede 
that colonialism, has negatively impacted African societies and has fostered war-torn 
states, the writers focus mainly on internal factors such as ethnicity, ideological and 
political differences, and intra-elite rivalries as the main sources of conflict on the 
continent, without putting emphasis on external factors. This work is therefore helpful 
as it presses the African leadership to find solutions to the problems that besiege their 
continent.  
Policy Literature 
A 1998 UN report on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace 
and Sustainable Development in Africa, is useful for this thesis. The report emanated 
from the concern of the international community about the intensity of armed conflict 
in Africa. Although the report does not focus exclusively on civil conflict, it provides 
an analysis of sources of conflict in Africa and assesses the two dimensions of conflict 
on the continent-- internal and external factors. The report apportions the blame to 
both exogenous and the internal factors that cause conflict in Africa.  
The report describes three ways in which conflict is necessitated and sustained. 
First, there are the root causes such as “extreme poverty, gross inequalities and weak 
                                                 
20Richard E. Barringer, ibid., p. 7.  
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state capacities.”21 The root causes have the potential to lead to conflict when they 
generate deep political, social, economic and cultural differences. Second, there are 
enabling factors which include “exclusionary government policies, external support 
for repressive regimes, and small arms proliferation”22 The enabling factors thus do 
not cause conflict per se, but “exacerbate the root causes or contribute to an 
environment that facilitates armed conflict. Third, there are mobilizing factors such as 
ethnicity, religion and economic conditions which are utilized by individuals or 
groups of individuals to induce violent actions.”23   Thus, the causes, enabling factors 
and mobilizing factors are all necessary to interrogate when analyzing conflict in 
Africa.  
The 2009 Tripoli Declaration on the Elimination of Conflicts in Africa provides 
testimony that African leaders have now shifted to a more balanced approach on 
matters related to peace and security in Africa and do not blame foreigners or 
companies for the civil strife that has bedeviled the continent. The declaration, 
adopted at Heads of State and Government level, acknowledges that factors such as 
poor governance, unconstitutional changes of government, an emerging trend of 
election violence and conflicts over natural resources contribute in a major way to 
civil conflict in Africa and the leaders further renounce unconstitutional changes of 
government which has become practice in some parts of Africa. As a result of these 
factors, the Heads of State and Government also acknowledge that it is no longer 
                                                 
21The Report of the UN Secretary General, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and 
Sustainable Development in Africa,” Presented to the General Assembly, doc. A/52/871, 1998,  p.7.  
Online at: http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/A_52_871_Causes%20of%20Confict%201998.pdf 
 
22 The Report of the UN Secretary General, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and 
Sustainable Development in Africa, pp. 7 - 9.  
23  The Report of the Secretary General, ibid. 
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feasible to address the root causes of conflict effectively without consideration for 
human rights, rule of law, democracy and good governance.24  
 
International Relations theories 
There are some theories /frameworks of international relations that may shed light 
on civil conflict in Africa.   Ozan Ormeci asserts that there are two dominant approaches 
to security studies, Realism and Liberalism.25 Constructivism is another IR theory which 
is of great importance in this thesis particularly as it sensitizes one to the extent to which 
human beings may manufacture conflict.  
Realism 
Realism is the oldest school of thought in international relations. 26 It is also the 
main school of thought in security studies.27 Power, self-help and survival are among the 
cornerstones of Realism. Accordingly, maximization of power, especially military power 
is of great importance to those who subscribe to realism. Realists assume that there is 
always a threat of war and one needs to always be prepared for a fight, hence it is always 
important to militarily prepare for war.28 It is important here to mention two particular 
subsets of realism, namely, offensive and defensive realism. Although these two hold the 
same set of bedrock assumptions, the conclusions of the proponents are divergent.    
 Defensive realists acknowledge that the nature of international politics is 
conflictual by nature and has been like that for most time in history and because of this 
                                                 
24Tripoli Declaration on the Elimination of Conflict in Africa and Promotion of Peace,  
doc.  2009/SP/Assembly/PS/Decl.1, 2009, p. 3. 
25Ozan Ormerci, “The Concept of Security and Security Studies,” Caspien Weekly, 24 September 2010, p. 3.  
26Theodore H. Cohn, Political Economy, p. 51. 
27 Ormerci, The Concept of Security and Security Studies, p. 3.  
28Stephen Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories”, Foreign Policy, no.10, Spring 1998, p. 30. 
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conflictual nature in international relations, there will always be war. However, to the 
defensive realists the presence of conflict in international politics should not always lead 
to actual war. Defensive realists argue that war can be prevented through cooperation and 
compromise, even in a state of anarchy.29    Defensive realists believe that to avoid actual 
war, states should pursue “moderate strategies as the best route to security, including, 
military, diplomatic and foreign economic policies that communicate restraint.”30 In his 
account, Danielle Costa buttresses this by establishing that defensive realism is 
particularly evident in a state that feels threatened or is in a state of decline. The leaders 
of a state in decline and therefore insecure will increase national security by pursuing 
ambiguous military, economic and diplomatic policies. However, the policies pursued in 
this scenario are not for expansion of power or influence as that particular state is not 
secure enough to pursue policies that are riskier for their internal security.31 In essence, 
defensive realists policies pursued are aimed at protecting a state, but not to provoke 
other states. It is only when they feel secure, that leaders would more provocative 
policies, to realize offensive realism.  
On the other hand, offensive realists’ approach appears provocative in nature.  
Danielle Costa establishes that, when states feel more secure militarily and economic 
wise, they tend adopt and pursue policies that are geared towards imposing influence in 
the international arena.32 These could be seen in the case of powerful countries such as 
the United States, Russia, among others, that have the appetite to influence international 
                                                 
29 Tang Shipping, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism (New York: Palgrave-McMillan, 
2010), pp. 150-151. 
 
30 Tang Shipping, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time, p. 151.  
 
31 Danielle Costa, “The End of Cold War: Defensive or Offensive Realism?” paper presented at Tufts University, 
American Foreign Policy, 4 December, 1998, p. 1.  
32 Danielle Costa, The End of Cold War: Defensive or Offensive Realism, ibid. 
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policies. Accordingly, a powerful state will project its power on other states with a view 
to expanding its influence in the international arena, whether that brings fear to others is 
not an issue because the powerful state is in a better position and advantage to go to war. .  
  Realists such as Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr base their 
conceptualization of state realism on human nature which they consider to be self-
regarding and hence conflictual. Niebuhr is known for his argument that human beings 
are by nature selfish and always pursue policies that are in line with their personal 
interest.  
When Thomas Hobbes presented his arguments on the social contract in 
“Leviathan,” he argued, along the lines of Niebuhr that “human beings are naturally 
selfish creatures”.33 This argument is particularly substantiated by the fact that self-
interests continuously crop up as a factor in many civil conflicts in Africa, particularly 
when government officials and warlords alike fight over control of the mineral wealth of 
their countries and when governments use the state apparatus, and law enforcement 
institutions to pursue their personal interests. Self-interest is also a factor in the 
intervention of neighboring states in support of different factions in civil conflict. In most 
cases, both neighboring states and those beyond the neighborhood enter a civil-conflict 
not to help in resolution or prevention, but to seek access to minerals in countries at war.   
Constructivism 
As already stated under primordial theory of conflict, the constructivist 
perspective posits that religion, ethnicity, culture, customs and clans are socially 
constructed by individuals and that the way human beings perceive them can be changed. 
To the constructivist, ethnicity, culture, customs and religion, are not innate and should 
                                                 
33Ozan Ormerci, “The Concept of Security and Security Studies,” p. 3.  
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not be force for war as they can be avoided.34 It is not that constructivists do not 
acknowledge that ethnicity and religion may have a role in conflict, but that these factors 
are not supposed to cause conflict. Constructivism is positive contributions that may help 
researchers make well informed assessments on the role of ethnicity and religion in civil 
conflict.  
Indeed there are those such as Paglia who oppose the constructivist view and 
argue in the analysis of the Sudan war,  that ethnic identities are complex and cannot be 
simplified by saying they are simply socially constructed.”35 In a sharp contrast with 
constructivism Paglia contends that ethnicity is innate because it is an identity of 
individuals and groups, and cannot be changed as the constructivists may have us 
believe.36 But, what is important is that Paglia’s finding concurs with constructivists that 
ethnicity and religion should not cause war. These factors therefore only find a place in 
the war equation when used by politicians and power seekers to create alliances. The 
findings of constructivists as well as those of Paglia generally show that ethnicity cannot 
be a root cause of conflict, but rather a mobilizing factor.  This thesis will align with 
these findings.  
Frustration aggression and relative deprivation theory 
The relationship between poverty and conflict is often explained through 
frustration aggression theory. The assumption is that an individual or group of 
individuals will become aggressive when they realize that there are obstacles to their 
                                                 
34 Sterling-Folker, “Making Sence of International Relations Theory,” 2008,  BOULDER, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers Inc.pp.13-38  
35
 Pamela Paglia, “Ethnicity and Tribalism: are these the Root Causes of the Sudanese Civil Conflict?” African 
conflicts and the Role of Ethnicity: A Case Study of Sudan, Africa Economic Analysis, p. 12. 
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success in life. In addition, the relative deprivation theory assumes that conflict arises 
when people feel deprived compared to others.37   These theories link frustration and 
aggression in the sense that they make an assumption that frustration leads to aggressive 
behavior.  This frustration may be caused by several factors such as inability of regimes 
to deliver what they promised the electorates, poor governance, lack of democracy and 
unequal distribution of wealth (as the Marxists would argue), unemployment, famine and 
poverty and so on.  
Human needs theory 
Ikeijauku and Dauda’s work on conflict in Africa surveys the human needs theory 
which provides an analysis that focuses on unmet human needs. According to this theory, 
when the basic human needs of individuals are unmet, aggressive behavior then will 
emerge.  The human basic needs theory emphasizes that the government’s inability to 
meet the basic needs of the population is a source of conflict.38 Indeed, on the African 
continent, there is denial or neglect of human needs such as material needs; recognition 
of different ethnic groups, particularly minority groups; and neglect of certain identities, 
such as human cost of unemployment to the youths seeking identity in society39 Basic 
needs are non-negotiable as asserted by Ikejiaku and Dauda and when they are unmet, 
struggle becomes inevitable. The ability or inability of governments to meet the basic 
needs of a society can be associated with the nature of the governance structures of a 
government and may therefore determine the future of a country.  
                                                 
37Rasheed Draman, Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship, p. 9. 
38 Brian-Vincent Ikejiaku and Jubril Dauda, “African Union, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution in Africa: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Recent Kenya and Zimbabwe Conflicts,” International Journal of Development and 
Conflict, vol. 1, no. 1, 2011, p. 65.  
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Although Ikejiaku and Dauda find the human basic needs theory useful in 
explaining the source of conflict, this thesis goes beyond to reveal that the unmet basic 
human needs are not only a source of for conflict, but also that the continuation of 
deprivation of human basic needs  prolongs conflict in Africa.  
The human basic needs theory and the frustration/deprivation theory are very 
much interlinked and mutually reinforcing for the reason that the denial of basic needs is 
equivalent to deprivation and may lead to anger and frustration which may eventually 
lead to outbreak of hostilities.  
In this chapter I have identified some literature that discusses several theories that 
attempt to explain the complex nature of civil conflict as well as factors that contribute to 
the outbreak of any form of war.  Through the literature and theories discussed, it is 
evident that disequilibrium among cultural, psychological, political and economic factors 
often lead to the outbreak of wars. The next chapter focuses on factors which play a role 
in civil war specifically in Africa.  
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CHAPTER 3 
  SOURCES OF CIVIL CONFLICT IN AFRICA 
 
The factors that often lead to the outbreak of civil conflict are social, cultural, 
psychological, political and economic in nature as indicated in the previous chapter. In 
this chapter the thesis seeks to identify the overall factors that actually contribute to civil 
conflict in Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa recognizing that such factors may be 
both internal (self inflicted) and external (encouraged by other countries) and in 
recognition that some other factors may be actual sources/causes, while others may 
enable war serve as the mobilizers for conflict. Distinguishing these factors will also 
contribute to simplifying the complex nature of war.  
 The Legacy of Colonialism 
The colonial legacy has been a source of conflict in Africa. This is because many 
of the former colonies inherited the political, social and economic structures of the 
colonial administrations which were not compatible with African societies and which 
were never intended to promote good governance, democracy or equitable socio-
economic and political development of societies but rather to protect the interest of the 
former colonialists. It does require a rocket scientist to determine that the African people 
were colonized against their will, therefore colonialism could not have planted a seed of 
democracy and good governance in Africa. No doubt, the structures of colonialism 
suppressed the right to self determination and human rights of the people of colonies, 
hence the liberation struggles throughout the African continent.   Fonken Achankeng’s 
piece of work buttresses the argument that “former colonial masters were not in search of 
good leaders for the people. The concerns of the colonial masters at independence and 
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beyond, for the most part, were to hand over power to a group of cronies whose mission 
was always not to govern people well, but to protect the interests of the metropole.”1 For 
Achankeng, the “crisis of internal governance and new institutions in Africa can both be 
traced to the colonization and the de-colonisation of Africa.’’2 Conflict prevention and 
resolution in Africa will therefore never be effective without using colonialism as a point 
of reference.  
The inherent weaknesses of the structures created by colonial governments 
negatively impacted the newly independent states.  It is also important to point out at this 
juncture that the arrival of the colonizers in Africa in the 19th century changed the simple 
social, political and economic discourse in an unprecedented manner.3  
For example, culturally within the African societies, there were various ethnic groups, 
each with its own norms, customs, and values, with a communal mode of 
production.4Accordingly, there were societal values which the communities complied 
with. Land was also used for planting crops and sharing the food within a community 
after harvest, but not for profit. The arrival of colonial rule therefore imposed an “alien 
structure complete with cultural, economic, educational, political and social systems.”5  
In economic terms, the commercial relations instituted by colonial administrations 
                                                 
1 Fonkem Achenkeng I, “Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa: Engaging the Colonial Factor,” p. 15.  
 
2 Fonkem Anchenkeng, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa: Engaging the Colonial Factor, ibid. 
3 Report of the Secretary General, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable 
Development in Africa,”A/52/871-S/1998/318, 13 April 1998, p. 3.  
 
4 George Kieh, Jr and Ida R. Mukenge, Zones of Conflict in Africa: Theories and Cases (Portsmouth: Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 2002), pp. 22-23. 
5 Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews, “Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution (London: McGill-Queens’s 
University Press, 1999), p. 4.  
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were deliberately designed to reflect the needs and interests of metropolitan societies.6  
The infrastructure such as railways and roads built during the colonial era were 
meant to transport commodities from Africa to the West. Colonialism introduced the 
capitalist mode of production to Africa, in an arrangement in which African countries 
exported raw materials to feed the industries of metropolitan states.   
In addition, as the colonial powers explored ways to entrench their rule in the 
colonies, they chose to exploit the local divisions which already existed in the 
communities. Thus, ethnic divisions exploited by the colonial powers were bitterly felt 
throughout many newly independent African states. The case of Angola for example, 
clearly reveals ways in which the Portuguese exploited divisions among the Angolan 
people. Today even a peaceful country like Botswana is struggling with tribal issues 
because, through a Native Delimitation Commission in 1899 and 1933 the British 
demarcated some tribes as the principal tribes. The Commission established native 
reserves in Bechuanaland (now Botswana) that consolidated the subordination of non-
Batswana ethnic groups.7 The Constitution of Botswana has inherited this as law and to 
date the country as whole is grappling with this unfair capture in its constitution.  
The overall impact of colonialism on Africa has generally been negative for the 
continent and should be considered as one of the sources of civil conflict in Africa. It is 
however important to note that many African leaders have come to accept the need to 
                                                 
6 Report of the Secretary General, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable 
Development in Africa”, A/52/871-S/1998/318, 13 April 1998, p .4.  
 
7 Munyae M. Mulinge, “Botswana, Africa’s Haven of Ethnic Peace and Harmony: Status and Future Prospects,” 
African Journal of Sociology, vol. 4, no. 1, 2008, p. 63.  
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look beyond the colonial past in order to resolve conflicts.8  Despite these challenges, 
Botswana and others such as Namibia and South Africa have been able to move forward 
as much as practicable, embracing prudent economic policies, strengthening institutions 
that promote good governance, and democracy for their populations. By and large, there 
are many countries in other parts of the world such as those in Asia, Caribbean and Latin 
America which have moved forward and embrace policies that bring hope to their 
populations.  
Cold War and Civil Conflict in Africa 
The cold war was an important enabling factor in fueling civil war in Africa, first  
because the super powers extended their influence and inhibited each other in far flung 
battlefields, and second, because local leaders mobilized external support for their own 
interests.9 The cold war also introduced a high level arms competition in Africa and fed 
the rebel movements and repressive governments alike, promoting poor governance.    
Jackie Cilliers argues that, although this (cold war) brought a degree of stability to the 
continent, it happened at the cost of tolerating oppressive and exploitative governments.10 
Support provided to these governments by the cold war superpowers and their supporters 
therefore left rebels and leaders comfortable with undemocratic and poor governance 
structures in their countries.  
Africa was also strategically important for the superpowers. Margaret Vogt 
affirms that “during the Cold War, the position of Africa was rated as central to the 
                                                 
8 Report of the Secretary General, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable 
Development in Africa,” p.4.  
9 Jackie Cilliers “Resource Wars, A New Type of Insurgency: The Role of Oil and Diamonds,” Institute for Security 
Studies, 2000, p. 1.   
10 Jackie Cilliers, Resource Wars, A New Type of Insurgency: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, ibid. p. 10.   
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spheres of influence of the great powers."11  As a result of excessive super power 
competition in Africa, some civil conflicts in Africa, such as in Angola and Mozambique, 
were seen as the manifestation of proxy wars.  
The behavior of the super powers also limited the ability of the UN Security 
Council to act or even detect conflict. Most interventions by the UN peace keeping 
missions in Africa came after the demise of the cold war. For example, in the case of 
Angola, a weak UN Verification Mission (UNAVEM) was only created in 1991, fifteen 
years after the eruption of the civil war. In essence the cold war played a significant role 
in ensuring the inability of the international community to act on time.   
Ethnicity and Civil Conflict in Africa 
The multiethnic character of many African countries “makes conflict more likely, 
often leading to politicization of ethnicity.”12 For their security and survival, communities 
and politicians may resort to capturing political power using ethnic alliances, making war 
inevitable.13 In many instances liberation movements in Africa “grew out of an ethno-
linguistic basis.”14    
On the other hand, as also noted earlier, Paglia affirms that ethnicity is not a cause of 
civil conflict in Africa, but rather an instrument of political mobilization through which 
civil wars are fought in Africa.15 It is an instrument used to divide and rule the population 
                                                 
11 Margaret A. Vogt, “Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity,”  
Monograph, no. 36, 1999, p. 1.  
12 Report of the Secretary General, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable 
Development in Africa”, A/52/871-S/1998/318, 13 April 1998, p.4 
13  Report of the Secretary General, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable 
Development in Africa, ibid. p. 4. 
14 L.W. Henderson, “ANGOLA: Five Centuries of Conflict”, 1979, United Kingdom, London, Cornel University 
Press, p. 259.  
15 Pamela Paglia, “Ethnicity and Tribalism: are these the Root Causes of the Sudanese Civil Conflict?”, African 
conflicts and the Role of Ethnicity: A Case Study of Sudan,  Africa Economic Analysis, p.7. 
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by pitting them against one another for political gains. Accordingly, Paglia notes that 
ethnicity is not conflictual in itself and the view that ethnicity is a primary source of 
conflict in Africa, is misleading in that it prevents the actual causes from being 
recognized and dealt with.  
Paglia further posits that multiethnic groups often struggle over control of scarce 
resources as well as for political power but these groups are used by those with selfish 
interests.16 The causes of the struggle are therefore the scanty resources which in some 
situations may not be allocated equitably. Thus, mismanagement or the inability to 
manage such scarce resources leads to competition for them and as such provides the 
basis for conflict. Abiero Mpondo agrees that ethnic groups do not have genetic codes for 
violence and conflict and that those opportunists who seek political power use ethnicity 
for political gains.   
Ethnicity therefore should be seen as a mobilizing factor in civil conflict in 
Africa. While it is not necessarily a source for conflict, it plays a role in perpetuating civil 
strife in many parts of Africa.   
 Economic sources of conflict 
Studies, most notably by the Post Conflict Unit at the World Bank, portray wars 
as driven essentially by economic agendas, particularly those conflicts in the developing 
world. Among the Bank’s analytical tools is a data set of conflicts over the period 1960 to 
1999 that seeks to examine the risk of civil war.17 Two lines of thought underpin this 
analysis of the relationship between war and economics: that easily exploitable natural 
                                                 
16 Pamela Paglia. Pamela Paglia, Ethnicity and Tribalism: are these the Root Causes of the Sudanese Civil Conflict?, 
ibid. p.15. 
 
17 Jakkie Cilliers, Angola’s War of Economy, p. 1-2.  
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resources are used to finance civil wars; and that the perpetuation of war in certain 
African countries serves as an alternative way of gaining income.18 
Kieh and Mukenge buttress the argument that the economic crisis that has beset 
Africa is the result of the interests of individuals and foreign-based multinational 
corporations and business interests seeking to gain more income. They further attach 
these economic interests to a capitalist system that is exploitative in nature, lacking the 
component of equal distribution of wealth.19  
Natural resource factor 
Africa is blessed with huge deposits of natural resources. As a result of these 
natural resources, the continent is attractive to business. These resources both enable and 
mobilize conflict on the African Continent. Competition for natural resources such as oil 
in Africa has attracted foreign interests and such external interests play a gigantic and at 
times decisive role in perpetuating or containing conflict on the continent.19 Many 
businesses and multinational corporations profit from chaos and the lack of 
accountability and as such, may have no interest in stopping conflict and rather, much 
interest in prolonging it.20 In the current efforts to resolve conflict in Africa, the 
international community and the UN have called on multinational corporations to be 
involved in conflict resolution efforts in Africa.  
In a statement to the UN the former Under Secretary General for the Office of 
Special Advisor on Africa asserted that “Africa is well known as home of the largest 
                                                 
18 Jakkie Cilliers, Angola’s War of Economy, ibid.  
19 Kieh, Jr and Mukenge, Theories of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, p. 29. 
19 Report of the Secretary General, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable 
Development in Africa”, A/52/871-S/1998/318, 13 April 1998, p.5 
20 Report of the Secretary General, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable 
Development in Africa, ibid. p.5 
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deposits of natural resources in the world.”21 The natural resources include substantial 
portions of oil in countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, and Libya, and diamonds in 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as other strategic 
minerals such as chrome, coltan, bauxite and manganese which are major export products 
for many African countries. The illegal exploitation of these natural resources and the 
lack of equitable distribution of wealth accrued thereof, has been a source of violence and 
instability in many of the countries which have experienced civil conflict.22  
The greatest challenge however, is that some African governments, leaders and 
rebels alike also act in cahoots with external powers and multinational companies and 
other business in trading conflict minerals. Material and financial gains are in fact central 
to many of the conflicts in Africa. In 2000, some UN officials accused presidents Taylor 
of Liberia and Blaise Compaore for their personal roles in trading arms for Sierra Leone 
diamonds, thereby fueling Sierra Leone conflict.  
In 2002, a peace treaty, Pretoria Accord Peace Treaty, which was supposed to 
have ended one of deadliest and most expensive wars the world over, was profusely 
undermined by rebel movements and some officials who did not want to cede power to 
government for fear of losing control over natural resources and land. The Pretoria 
Accord Peace Treaty stipulated that all signatory rebel movements should cede power to 
the national army, the FRDC.  
Natural resources in Cote d’Ivoire’s were also key to that country’s war as both 
rebels and government failed to agree to return the country to democracy, as leaders and 
                                                 
21 Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, “Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: Transforming A Peace Liability into a 
Peace Asset”, (Paper presented in Egypt, Cairo, 17-19 June 2006).  
22 Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: Transforming A Peace Liability into a 
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rebels had the desire to exploit the natural resources – diamond, cocoa and cotton,  for 
funding the war and for personal gains.  
Poverty 
Many scholars have examined the role of poverty in civil conflict in Africa. While 
some writers believe that poverty is a cause of conflict, others have argued that it is 
conflict that causes poverty. Notwithstanding this debate, it is generally agreed that 
poverty is one of the principal factors, in civil conflict in Africa. Before emphasizing the 
role of poverty in civil conflict in Africa, it is important to reflect borrow Draman’s five 
classification of poverty: 
First, absolute poverty, occurs when human beings live in a state of deprivation due to 
meager income or lack of access to basic human needs which include food, safe water, 
sanitation, health, shelter, education, and information. Second, relative poverty defines 
poverty from a comparative point of view. Here poverty is not absolute but relative (a 
situation in which, say, a given group of people compare themselves with another in the 
same society. Third, administrative poverty includes all those who are eligible for state 
welfare because they are either temporarily unemployed and/or unable to earn an income. 
Fourth, consensual poverty depends on the perceptions of what the public deems to be below 
basic sustenance. Finally, contextual poverty is based on a comparison of poverty to the 
socio-cultural and economic levels of a particular society.’23   
Absolute poverty and to a certain extent relative poverty, can be considered as the 
two main factors in civil conflict in Africa. This is because most countries which have  
had civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa, were or are at the time of going to war classified as 
Least Developed countries, with large numbers of people living under the poverty  line of 
$1/ $1.25 per day, representing absolute poverty. Of a total 38 Least Developed countries 
                                                 
23 Rasheed Draman, Poverty and Conflict in Africa, p.p. 2 – 3.  
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in the world, 34 are in Africa. Many of these countries, though some have experienced 
solid economic growth after the end of civil war, have been to war or are still going 
through civil strife. These include Angola, Cote i'voire, DRC, Liberia, Mali, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Mozambique, Mauritania, Chad, South Sudan and Sudan. 
 Nancy Annan maintains that poverty is one of the main factors that afflict the 
African continent and contribute to violent conflicts in the region, especially sub Saharan 
Africa. In West Africa for example, Annan states that, over 60 percent of the population 
lives below the poverty line, which certainly leads to civil unrest and grievances.24 In 
particular, she states poverty as one of the root causes of the Liberian civil war.25 
The point is that, those who feel neglected and deprived of the necessary needs 
and believe that poverty is being deliberately inflicted upon them by undemocratic and 
dictatorial regimes will often rebel. This form of rebellion is well articulated by the 
Marxist perspective.  
The issue of poverty in the context of civil conflict in Africa is very much linked 
to deprivation, poor governance, and corruption because deprivation of basic needs 
results in poverty and poverty usually emanates from “inequalities in the distribution of 
economic resources in a state.27  
 Political sources of conflict 
 State failure is a foundation and source of civil strife. State failure stems from 
factors such as skewed political power, corruption, poor governance, different forms of 
discrimination, lack of accountability, and the lack of respect for the rule of law, human 
                                                 
24 Nancy Annan, “Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges and Prospect,” International 
Journal of Security and Development, vol. 3, no. 1, 2014, p. 7.  
25 Nancy Annan, Ibid.  
27 Kieh, Jr and Mukenge, Theories of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, p. 12. 
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rights abuses, greed and so on. Under such circumstances, the patience of the masses – be 
it private citizens, women or youth - becomes limited and an uprising against regimes 
becomes inevitable. This thesis aligns with those who believe that fragmented and weak 
institutions in many African countries enable conflict to brew and escalate. 
William Zartman perceives governance as a conflict management tool which does 
not only prevent violence but also handles ordinary conflicts and demands of a society.28 
Good governance is however effective only if supported by strong institutions and is also 
only possible when the policies are implemented by a legitimate democratic government. 
Insufficient weak institutions mean lack of capacity to respond to the simplest demands 
made by society, which eventually leads to rebellion when the people get frustrated. 
Mansoob Murshed also maintains that civil conflict can emanate from demands for civil 
rights in states where democracy is absent.29 
African leaders themselves have come to acknowledge that stability cannot be 
attained without good governance, rule of law, and prudent economic and political 
management. In the 2009 Tripoli Declaration on the Elimination of Conflicts in Africa, 
African leaders officially acknowledged that poor governance, unconstitutional changes 
of government, and an emerging trend of election violence significantly contribute to 
civil conflict in Africa and that it is no longer feasible to address the root causes of 
conflict effectively without consideration for human rights, rule of law, democracy and 
good governance.30 Between 2008 and 2010, the African Union suspended Mauritania, 
                                                 
28 Willian Zartman, “Governance as a Conflict Management: Political Violence in West Africa”, 1997, (Washington 
DC, The Brooking Institute, 1997), p. 1-2.  
29 Mansoob Murshed, “Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment,” Journal of Peace Research, vol.39, no.4, 2002,    
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Guinea Bissau and Madagascar from the Union, following unconstitutional changes of 
government on those countries. This is one of the efforts made by the Union in an attempt 
to promote democracy and peace in African states. However, the endorsement of Mugabe 
of Zimbabwe as the Union’s President for 2015 brings to question the commitment of 
Africa’s leadership towards democracy and good governance, in view of human rights 
abuses by the President.   
In this chapter, I have attempted to establish factors that often lead to outbreak of 
hostilities in Africa. The chapter further identified factors that cause conflict, those that 
enable it as well as those factors that mobilize conflict. The chapter has shown that there 
is a multiplicity of factors that contribute one way or the other, to civil conflict in Africa.  
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CHAPTER 4 
ANGOLA 
Angola is a former Portuguese colony which gained independence on 11 
November 1975.  The 4th of February 1961 is a date presently associated with the 
beginning of armed struggle in Angola, when a brutal war against the Portuguese erupted 
in Luanda, the capital.1Upon the Portuguese withdrawal in 1974, the question of who was 
to inherit power came to the fore. Proposals to forge a Government of National Unity 
(GNU) failed. Instead, the movements which had fought the Portuguese during the 
liberation struggle opted to wage a war among themselves. A brutal civil war became one 
of the worst in Africa lasting until 2002.   
At the beginning three nationalist movements were at the forefront of both the 
liberation struggle and civil war, Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola 
(MPLA) formed in 1956 and headed by Augusto Neto and later by Jose Eduardo Dose 
Santos; the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) formed in 1962, led by 
Holden Roberto; and the Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) founded in 
1966 and led by Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi.  
With Soviet and Cuban assistance, MPLA achieved a military victory against the 
other nationalist movements.  Thus, when Angola gained independence on 11 November 
1975, the country came under the control of a Marxist-Leninist MPLA government led by 
Augusto Neto who was succeeded by Dos Eduardo Dose Santos after his death in 1979.  
At independence Angola was set up as a one party state under MPLA. 
Savimbi continued to fight a 'guerrilla' war against the MPLA government until 
his death in February 2002.  The civil conflict lasted for 27 years, despite many 
                                                 
1Alex Vines “Angola: Forty Years of War,” in Peter Batchelor and Kees Kingma, ed., Demilitarisation and Peace 
Building in Southern Africa (Aldershot (etc):Ashgate, 2004), p. 74 – 104.  
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interventions by the international community. The Angolan civil war degenerated into 
one of the most brutal and longest civil wars on the continent of Africa.    
Ideological Cold War factor 
At independence in 1975 the MPLA government was guided by a Marxist-
Leninist ideology.  UNITA had on the other hand resisted the MPLA government and 
portrayed itself as anti-Marxist and pro-Western.2   In Angola, "MPLA was supported by 
50 000 Cuban troops and advisors, from the Soviet Union while UNITA was supported 
by South African troops and money and equipment from the United States.’’3 The 
continued support from the United States and the Soviet Union helped maintain the 
Angolan civil war leading experts to term the war as, “a classic cold war proxy war."  
The Cold War prolonged the Angolan civil war in three related ways; first, 
support provided to UNITA by the United States provided the confidence and financial 
resources for the former to continue its resistance against the government. Secondly, the 
support of the two superpowers ensured that the two warring parties had access to 
ammunitions and arms. 
    Thirdly, the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union 
prevented the Security Council from acting effectively in the civil war. The United States 
and the Soviet (now Russia) have veto powers in the United Nations Security Council 
and no resolution can be effective when the two are in sharp disagreement. It was 
therefore only in 1989, fourteen years after the outbreak of the civil war, that the Security 
Council decisively agreed to establish a  UN Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM 
I). It was not by coincidence that this occurred. It correlated with the weakening and the 
                                                 
2 Alex Vines, Angola: Forty Years of War, p. 74 – 104.  
3 Nel and McGowan, Power, Wealth and Global Order: An International Relations Book for Africa, 
 (Capetown: University of Capetown Press, 1999) p. 233.  
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eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and end of cold war, the result of which was the 
relaxation of diplomatic corridors, especially in the United Nations.   
There is no evidence reflecting that either of the two superpowers ever vetoed a 
UN Mission to Angola. However, it is clear that during the cold war, the two 
superpowers were mostly interested in advancing their ideologies and not necessarily 
committed to peace, security or development of the countries that they divided. The 
resolutions that were also adopted during that time were too weak to end the civil conflict 
in many countries. Manuel Paulo, paraphrasing the UN Mission head in Angola, 
Margaret Anstee, maintains that the superpowers’ differences often led to quick fixes 
which often resulted in flawed and ineffective agreements – referring particularly to the 
weak resolution 696 of Security Council which established UNAVEM II.4 Furthermore, 
the number of UN troops and the civilian staff initially sent to Angola was inadequate to 
contain the conflict. 
Potential for the UN Security Council to gain more prominence in peace keeping 
efforts was enhanced with the end of cold war as evidenced by the Security Council 
approval of stronger peace keeping operations, not only in Angola, but also other 
countries such as Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and Chad. The demise of the 
Soviet Union and its disintegration meant that the United States was left as the world’s 
superpower.  It also meant that the disintegrated Soviet Union had become weak and 
could no longer support the MPLA. Consequently, the United States decided to withdraw 
its aid from UNITA, a move which eventually led to the weakening of UNITA and 
subsequently, the death of Savimbi. 
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Arguably, had the United States and the Soviet Union cooperated from the time of 
the outbreak of hostilities in Angola and agreed on a stronger resolution to deploy the UN 
troops to settle the problem before it escalated, the situation would have probably been 
different. Unfortunately, the involvement of the two superpowers deliberately deepened 
the divisions which already existed in Angola. Although the cold war has ended there are 
still disagreements between the US and Russia which continue to undermine the work of 
the Security Council to maintain peace and stability as evidenced by the ongoing 
situation in Syria. 
Ethnicity 
 The Angolan nationalist movements were created on the basis of ethnicity as 
affirmed by Lawrence Henderson who notes that the Angolan movements “grew out of 
ethnolinguistic soils."5   While FNLA drew its support from the Bakongo ethnic group 
based in northern Angola, UNITA and MPLA drew support from Ovimbindu of the 
South and East Mbundu of central Angola respectively.6 Ovimbindu was at the time 
Angola’s largest tribe.  
The Portuguese colonists had also played their role in exploiting ethnic divisions 
to suppress the Angolan people. Henderson indicates that the Portuguese referred to the 
Mbindu people as “assimilados” because they were educated and of bourgeois status and 
based in Luanda and other urban areas, hence more assimilated with the Portuguese than 
other groups.7By contrast, the Ovimbindu were referred to as the “indegenas” with little 
                                                 
5 Lawrence W. Henderson, Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict (London: Cornel University Press, 1979),  
  p .259.  
6 William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Africa, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 
  p.184. 
7 Lawrence W. Henderson, Angola:  Five Centuries of Conflict, p. 259.  
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or no education. This perception of “assimilados” and “indegenas” deepened hostilities 
between the MPLA and UNITA supporters.   
  In the late 1980s UNITA began to weaken and Savimbi appointed his 
relatives to control UNITA's security. Its intelligence units were dominated by the 
Ovimbindu people.  This was done in an attempt to hold the movement together.  In 
recognition of the magnitude of the role of ethnicity in the civil war, dos Santos 
attempted to neutralize UNITA by setting aside some posts in the MPLA and 
Government for Ovimbindu people. During the peace processes of early 1990s and after 
the demise of the Soviet, dos Santos made an attempt to minimize the influence of the 
ethnic factor in Angolan politics and reserved some senior posts within government and 
his political party, MPLA. As a result, there were mixed ethnicities within MPLA. 
Against this background, ethnic rivalry in Angola was a factor well exploited by the 
political leaders for party formations and for mobilizing allies. While ethnicity is very 
much pronounced in this war, it does not appear to have prolonged the war particularly in 
view of the fact dos Santos was successful in neutralizing ethnicity in the politics of 
Angola, at least ten years before the end of civil war.  
    Natural Resources 
Angola is a country blessed with abundant natural resources. In particular, the 
abundance of high quality oil and diamonds drew the world’s most powerful foreign 
corporations to its shores, during the war and after. Angola is the second largest producer 
of oil in sub-Saharan Africa, after Nigeria and the country became a member of the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 2007.8  
                                                 
8  US Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Brief: Angola,” 2015, p.1. 
   Online at: http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Angola/angola.pdf  
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The mineral wealth of Angola meant that the country was important to 
governments and business companies alike. Victor Luvhengo states that, large oil 
multinational corporations (MNCs) such as EXXOMobil, Royal Dutch, Sell, Chevron 
and the British Petroleum, among others operated in Angola from 1955 when oil was 
discovered.9 In addition Luvhengo’s research shows that the South African based 
Debeers diamond mining company also operated in Angola and in support of the UNITA. 
A Report of EFF indicates that UNITA was supported specifically by the United States, 
United Kingdom and France while the government was supported by Cuba and the 
USSR/Russia.10 Belgium, South Africa and Germany are also cited among countries that 
intervened in the war in support of UNITA.  According to the report, access to diamond 
territories and the sales thereof, helped the rebel movement to attract foreign 
governments and business companies as well. In-fact what had appeared as clash of 
capitalism and communism ended as a clash for minerals in Angola.11  
 It is clear that during the cold war, in addition to the interest of preventing 
communism from spreading, the countries involved were attracted to Angola because of 
the country’s potential minerals.  With the help of multinational corporations, Western 
powers and other international allies, including some African countries, such as apartheid 
South Africa took advantage of the Angolan conflict and encouraged the smuggling of 
diamonds through illicit trade, thus making conflict resolution in that country close to 
impossible.   
                                                 
9 Victor Luvhengo, Multinational Corporations and Human Rights Violations in African Conflict Zones: The Case 
Study of Angola 1992-2005,” A research report for Masters of Arts Degree in the Faculty , University of  
the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2006, p. 33.  
10 EEF Annual Report, “Angola: Preliminary Mission to Kuito, Bie Province,” 30 May – 7 June, 2003, p. 16. 
11 EEF Annual Report, Angola, Ibid.  
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However, in 1993 the United Nations Security Council through its resolution 864 
approved an arms embargo against Angola. The resolution prohibited all sale and supply 
of arms to UNITA, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment 
and spare parts for the aforementioned. This was in reaction to the deteriorating political, 
military and humanitarian situation in Angola and the continued suspension of peace 
talks.12 The resolution further barred external forces from supporting both the Angolan 
Government and UNITA. This embargo however did not speak to the issue of the illegal 
sales of diamonds and this is why ittook another decade for Savimbi to be eventually 
defeated in 2002. He was still able to continue war for a decade because he was still in 
possession of diamonds which he was still able to sell and use the residues to pay his 
militants.  
Poor governance and lack of democracy 
Governance institutions and other institutions of a state under civil conflict are 
usually far too weak to produce effective policies and laws or even to implement and 
monitor those that existed prior to conflict. Under such conditions, human rights are 
systematically violated and corruption and nepotism are rampant leading to chaos that 
only result in a disorganized society.  
Angola was no different during its 27 year civil conflict. To start with the MPLA 
government from the onset rejected democracy by establishing a one party state system at 
independence.  Thus Angola did not have a democratic foundation.  There was no 
equality between the people of Angola. It was only in 1992, after seventeen years of 
conflict, that Angola held its first ever democratic elections, which in some views were 
flawed. Jonas Savimbi actually rejected the outcome of the elections because he believed 
                                                 
12 UN Security Resolution S/Res 865, 15 September, 1993. New York. 
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that they had not been fair. The international observers accepted the result, but, also 
pointed to irregularities.  
 Tore Nyhamar argues that the end of war in Zimbabwe in the 80s was because 
the leaders of those countries transitioned into democracy, while attempts to do so in 
Angola failed dismally.13 There was rampant corruption during the war and the wealth of 
the country rested in the hands of a few. Even after the war Angola is a country that is 
still struggling with transitioning into good governance and the wealth of the country still 
rests in the hands of a few.  
Both UNITA and the government violated human rights. Richard Dietrich states 
that the MPLA Government committed widespread and systematic human rights 
violations through the military and national police, squandering large amounts of the 
state’s wealth. 14  As also observed in The Economist, the war gave MPLA an excuse to 
jail and harass civilians who opposed undemocratic government policies and practices 
and that when the population asked about oil revenues, MPLA leaders would often cite 
issues of national security and “keep mum.” 15 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Tore Nyhamar, “Transitioning to Democratic Constitutions in Ethnic Conflicts: A Game Theoretic Analysis,” 
Peace and Conflict Studies: vol. 4: no. 2, Article 4, 1997, p. 1.  
14 Richard Dietrich, “Ethical Considerations for Multinationals in Angola.” p. 237-238   
15 Jonas Savimbi,” The Economist Print Edition, 28 February 2002.  
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Poverty  
Poor governance, the absence of democracy and greed left the majority of the 
Angolan people under abject poverty in a land of plenty. By the time war ended in 
Angola, at least 68 percent of the people lived under the poverty line. The assimilados 
who were mostly associated with MPLA had access to better education and the wealth of 
Angola, while the indegenas associated with UNITA and who also outnumbered the 
assimilados were concentrated in rural areas with little access to education, health 
facilities and the general wealth of Angola. This contributed to the exacerbation of civil 
conflict in Angola, as the indegenas people who were mostly poor continued the struggle 
against the assimilados dominated government. Thus during the war, the majority  of 
people lacked basic needs and were unemployed which no doubt angered them for the 
government could not fulfill their needs. In fact, while Angola appears to be improving in 
the area governance and while the economy has significantly grown since the war, the 
country is still struggling to show commitment to its people. Angola is still among the 
least developed country and poverty is still wide spread to date.   
This chapter has established several factors that led to the outbreak of hostilities 
in Angola which include colonialism, ideological, poor governance and the lack of 
democracy, poverty and deprivation. However, the significant factors that appear to have 
prolonged the civil war in Angola are competition for control over minerals by both the 
MPLA government and UNITA rebel movement.  The involvement of MNCs and direct 
involvement of some governments played a gigantic role in the prolongation of the war. 
The proceeds from diamonds and oil were used to purchase arms and pay militants which 
helped Savimbi to sustain his war against government. This is also in addition to the fact 
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that Angola’s political system was initially based on a one party state system which was 
as corrupt as the rebel movement, where the wealth of the country rested in the hands of a 
few leading to excessive poverty and famine across the country, despite the huge wealth.  
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CHAPTER 5 
LIBERIA 
The first settlers of Monrovia, known as Americo-Liberians, who were freed 
slaves from the United States arrived in Monrovia between 1829 and 1835.1 When the 
settlers arrived in Liberia there were already indigenous populations such as the Mel 
speakers (Gola and Kis); Kwa speakers (Basa, Belle, Dei, Grebo, Krahn and Kru); and 
Mende speakers (Bandi, Dahn, Kpelle,Loma, Mandingo, Mano and Mande).2 Upon 
arrival of the Americo-Liberians, the American Colonization Society (ACS) took over the 
governing of the territory and used the American Constitution to run area.  
The Americo-Liberians successfully negotiated their way out of the American 
dominion. Thus, in 1847, Liberia was established as a Republic under the flagship of the 
True Whig Party (TWP) led by President J.J. Roberts, an Americo-Liberian.  A new 
Constitution which was based on the American law was adopted. TWP as a political party 
of the Americo- Liberians would dominate Liberian politics until 1980. The era in which 
the TWP dominated, 1847 to 1980, was a period during which the indigenous people of 
Liberia were oppressed and discriminated. Americo-Liberians ran Liberia like a colony.  
The newly adopted constitution which was a replica of the American constitution 
prohibited indigenous groups from participating in the economic and political affairs of 
the country.3  Although the indigenous people made 98 per cent of the population, they 
were not involved in the national decision-making.4  
                                                 
1 Major I.A. Nass, “A Study in Internal Conflicts: the Liberian Crisis and the West Africa Peace Initiative,” Fourth 
Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd, 2000, p .6.   
2Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews, Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution, (Toronto: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1999), p. 91. 
3Heneryatta Ballah etaal, “Ethnicity, Politics and Social Conflict: The Quest for Peace in Liberia,” in George       
Klay Kier, Jr., ed., The First Liberian War, (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2008), p. 57.  
4Major I.A. Nass, A Study in Internal Conflicts, p. 9.  
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Political and economic change emerged when William V.S. Tubman ascended to 
power in 1944. Tubman was the first Liberian President who pursued a policy of 
integrating the indigenous population into national society.  The cornerstone policies of 
his regime, the National Unification Policy and the Open Door Policy, were amalgamated 
to integrate the indigenous into the society and to open Liberia to foreign investors 
respectively.5 During his administration Liberia grew economically and the country 
became the second fastest growing in the world with iron ore bringing wealth to the 
country. Tubman was succeeded by Tolbert when he died in1971.   
Having organized themselves, indigenous people of Liberia began their offensive 
against the Americo-Liberian and turned against each other. The 14 year civil war left 
between 150 000 - 200 000 people, mostly civilians, dead and at least 1 million refugees 
in neighboring countries.6 A breakaway movement from NPLF, the Independent Patriotic 
Front for Liberia (INPLF), led by Prince Johnson emerged in 1990 and eventually 
assassinated Samuel Doe in September 1990.7  An Interim Government of National Unity 
(IGNU) led by Dr. Amos Sawyer was established through negotiations by the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). A  Cease-fire Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG)   was also established to keep peace after the death of Doe.  
Despite efforts made by ECOWAS and the international community, including an 
arms embargo imposed by the Security Council in 1992 and the appointment of a Special 
                                                 
5Augustine Konneh, “Understanding the Liberian Civil War, ” in George Kieh and Ida Mukenge ed., “Zones of 
Conflict in Africa: Theories and Cases,” (Portsmouth: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002),  p. 75.  
6  Damien Fruchart and  Paul Holtom et al, “UN Embargoes, Their impact on arms flow and target behavior: A Case 
Study on Liberia, 1992-1996, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007, p. 2.  
7  Damien Fruchart and Paul Holton , UN Embargoes, p. 3,   
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Representative of the Secretary General, violence in Liberia escalated.8 Charles Taylor 
eventually won 75 percent of the votes in the 1997 general elections in which 13 parties 
participated. 9  Taylor’s regime, however, became the most brutal in Liberia’s history. 
Unable to tolerate Taylor’s regime, the people of Liberia led by Liberia United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), later the Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
(MODEL), escorted to armed resistance.  
The Ethnic  
Samuel Doe became the first indigenous Liberian President in 1989 after 
overthrowing Tolbert in a coup. Samuel Doe’s operations ended the era the Americo-
Liberian dominion in the Liberian political and economic affairs. His political movement, 
the People’s Redemption Council (PRC) was formed by the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic 
groups. However, after defeating the Americo-Liberian regime, the army which was also 
dominated by the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups began a “bloody campaign mainly 
targeting the Gios and Manos” ethnic groups.10 The Krahn and Mandingo replaced the 
Americano-Liberians in the political and economic arena of Liberia. Samuel Doe’s 
actions brew ethnic tensions in Liberia. From 1985, a series of ethnic-based political 
formations rose as other suppressed ethnic groups came to resent Doe’s Krahn-Mandingo 
ethnic groups leadership. In particular, Charles Taylor assembled the Gio and Mano 
ethnic groups who had been angered by Doe’s government and formed the National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). The Gio and Mano groups were thus eager to revenge 
                                                 
8  UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia, Background:1989-1997. Online at 
www.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/background.shtml)- 
      
9 Augustine Konneh, “Mandingo Intergration in the Liberian Political Economy,” in George Klay Kier,ed., Zones of     
Conflict in Africa (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), p. 87.  
10  Ezinne C. Oji, “Child Soldiers in Liberia: History, Horror and Hope,” paper, 2004. p. 6.  
    Online at:  web.stabford.edu/class/e297a/civil wars in Africa.htm.  
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against the Krahns and Mandingos.11 
The Liberian civil war broke out on Christmas of 1989 when Charles Taylor and 
his ethnic Gio/Mano dominated National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) began an 
offensive against Doe and his Krahn and Mandigo ethnic group.12 The continued struggle 
would thus rely on ethnic alliances for a while.  
         Poor Governance, lack of democracy 
Poor governance and misappropriation of funds were evident in the successive 
governments, even prior to the assumption of power by the indigenous people. Revenues 
from Liberia’s natural resources – gold, diamonds, rubber and timber were at beginning 
in the hands of Americo-Liberians. This led to the prosperity of Americo-Liberians who 
became the core of the society while on the other hand, the majority of the people, 
indigenous, were left on the periphery. Despite political and economic changes, Konneh 
highlights that the indigenous remained disadvantaged because they were still not well 
represented at the core of decision making and also because the Americo-Liberians had 
for a long time accumulated much wealth at the expense of the indigenous Africans who 
were usually providing labour to the much wealthier Americo-Liberians.13 This master- 
servant kind of relationship extended to the military as well, where the Americo-Liberian 
officers (core) served as senior officials, while on the other hand indigenous people (the 
periphery) often served as regular officers.  
Nass observes that the master-servant relationship between the Americo-Liberians 
and the indigenous prepared a solid ground for discontentment. During his 
                                                 
11  Ezinne C. Oji, Child Soldiers in Liberia, ibid.  
 
13 Augustine Konneh, “Mandingo Intergration in the Liberian Political Economy,” in George Klay Kier,ed., Zones of 
Conflict in Africa (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 86.  
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administration, there was a deterioration of economic conditions with high inflation and 
lack of food self-sufficiency. Corruption, nepotism and excessive violation of human 
rights became the order of the day and led to uprisings in Liberia as students and labour 
unions called on Tolbert to step down.14 Added to this, indigenous people for the first 
time began to organize themselves into political groups. 
According to Nass, Samuel Doe orchestrated the coup to counter the rampant 
corruption, government inefficiencies and ineffectiveness, violations of human, civil and 
constitutional rights, the concentration of power in the hands of the few and the erosion 
of the participatory system.15 However, Nass, Ali and Matthews; and Konneh all note that 
Doe's regime was characterized by incompetence and extremely poor democratic norms 
in which a single ethnic group- the Krahn- replaced the Americo-Liberians. With no clue 
about economic management or any form of management, Doe, who led the country for 
10 years, Liberia to a state of near collapse as the economy plummeted to the lowest 
levels. Essentially, Doe failed to deliver.  Student and labour union strikes and protests 
became regular emboldening the arrogant regime to commit further atrocities against the 
Liberian people, including the innocent. 
It was after the election of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as Liberia’s first post 
conflict democratically-elected president and Africa’s first democratically-elected 
president, that Liberia for the first time in its history tasted democracy and good 
governance. Liberians had for decades been forced to live under various forms of 
oligarchic, autocratic, militaristic and authoritarian governments.16 The Truth and 
Reconciliation describe corruption in Liberia as ‘scandal of the 21st Century’ and 
                                                 
14Major I.A. Nass, A Study in Internal Conflicts, p. 30.   
15Major I.A. Nass, A Study in Internal Conflicts, p. 41.  
16 Report of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission, vol. 1, p. 2.  
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maintained that poverty, greed, corruption, and limited access to education, social, civil, 
political inequalities were major causes for conflict in Liberia.17  While this corruption is 
evident from the formation of the Liberian state, there is no evidence showing 
determination of Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor to establish democracy in the country 
or to create institutions that would truly lead to democracy and good governance.  The 
extra-judicial executions of opponents and some former cabinet ministers by Doe’s 
regime, and the confiscation of property of Americano-Liberians does not in any way 
reflect dedication to create good governance, but rather, a demonstration of greed and 
undemocratic brutal rule on his part, which forced the Americano- Liberians to actually 
support Charles Taylor’s uprising. Indeed Doe failed to create the means to protect the 
human rights of Liberians, and failed to promote socio-economic equalities, the result of 
which deepened the crisis in his country. 
Equally, the last dictator, Charles Taylor continued the corruption and exploitation 
of the already existing ethnic divisions, which ensure consistent abject poverty in Liberia.  
Poverty 
According to Report on the Poverty Eradication Strategy for Liberia, the political 
power, infrastructure and basic services were concentrated in Monrovia, and there was 
marginalization of youth and women. Mismanagement of national resources was 
widespread and this situation contributed to stark inequalities in the distribution of the 
country’s wealth.18 The over-concentration of power in the hands of a few bred 
corruption and decision making was restricted to the few. Civil society participation was 
                                                 
17 Report of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission, vol. 1, Ibid, p. 4.  
18 Poverty Reduction Strategy of the Republic of Liberia 2008 - 2011, April 2008, p. 14.  
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extremely limited which no doubt undermined good governance. Successive governments 
however failed to correct the ills of society and magnified the problems.19 
Throughout the history of Liberia and up to the end of the civil war, evidence 
adequately shows the unbalanced distribution of the country’s diamond wealth. The very 
poor governance and undemocratic state of Liberia, greed, and unemployment meant 
basic needs of the majority remained unmet by the political leadership.  Americano-
Africanos were wealthy and dominating decision-making while the majority of the 
people of Liberia remained under abject poverty leading to their struggle against the 
regime of Americano-Afrocanos. As indicated before, the Doe and Taylor regimes 
maintained the status quo and continued to deprive the people of Liberia. The war in 
Liberia was also a struggle by those who were under abject poverty.  Those desperate for 
change and those who felt deprived, would find no reason to preserve the regimes that 
oppressed them.  
Natural resources as a factor in prolonging civil conflict in Liberia 
The Liberian war demonstrates clear linkages between natural resources and 
foreign economic interests. The interests of several countries and nationalities from 
within and without Africa are conspicuous in every front. In particular, the United States, 
Sweden and Lebanese traders were largely motivated by economic and business interests 
in rubber and oil ore. According to Ali and Matthews, “at the height of the war, when 
Taylor controlled the bulk of the country there was a thriving export trade in diamond, 
timber, gold and agricultural products, made possible through a network of foreign 
firms.”20 They add that, Canadian, British, Japanese and French companies continued 
                                                 
19 Poverty Reduction Strategy of the Republic of Liberia, Ibid.  
20 Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews, Civil Wars in Africa, p 107.  
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business with Liberia at the height of the civil war. It is important to mention also that 
Monrovia served as the centre where diamond smugglers met or waited for the “blood 
diamond” emanating from Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF). 
The international trade centre in Antwerp, Belgium readily accepted RUF 
diamonds which were being shipped from Monrovia. These were blood diamonds 
emanating from Liberia’s war-torn neighbor, Sierra Leone. As a result of availability of 
markets for blood diamonds, which provided much finance for Taylor to maintain a 
luxurious and opulent life, it became crucial for him to cling to power and to control the 
diamond industry both in Liberia and in Sierra Leone. It was against this backdrop that 
Taylor had to maintain ties with and support the RUF’s brutality in Sierra Leone. Sierra 
Leone’s RUF no doubt fed Taylor’s appetite for diamonds for more than a decade.   
Following international pressure to end impunity in Liberia, Charles Taylor 
eventually gave in and resigned from his presidential seat in August 2003. At the time of 
his resignation, Taylor had also been indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
which had been set up by the Government of Sierra Leone in conjunction with the United 
Nations. The Special Court was mandated to bring to trial, the perpetrators of atrocities 
committed against the people of Sierra Leone between 1996 and 1999.   
Taylor’s resignation gave way to a successful cease fire agreement. Thus a Peace 
Agreement between the Government of Liberia (GOL), The Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), The Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
(MODEL) and the Political Parties was concluded in August 2003. The agreement was 
negotiated in Ghana, as an initiative of the Economic Community for West African States 
(ECOWAS). The agreement aimed to amicably settle the crisis which had plundered 
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Liberia for many years. Specifically the parties agreed to create a stable political 
environment and to promote democracy, good governance and the rule of law for 
sustainable development of the people of Liberia and most importantly to establish an 
interim government which will lead in the creation of conducive environment for 
elections.21 Subsequent to the ceasefire agreement, in September 2003, the United 
Nations Security Council established a United Nations Peace Keeping Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL) in order to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. The 
agreement and the establishment of UNMIL paved the way for democratic elections that 
left current President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf at the helm of power in 2005.  
In 2012, Taylor was slapped with a 50 year jail sentence specifically for aiding the 
RUF rebels and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in Sierra Leone.   
This chapter has fully investigated the several factors that require attention by those 
interested in conflict analysis in Liberia and Africa in general. Indeed, while many factors 
successfully contributed to protraction of the conflict, it is evident from the chapter that 
the diamond trade between Liberia and the international businesses and the desire of 
Liberia’s leaders to control resources, was of paramount importance in stretching the 
Liberian civil war. The source of diamonds for Liberia however, during Taylor’s era was 
Sierra Leone, which makes the analysis of Liberia’s civil war and natural resources a bit 
more complicated than that of Angola.  
This chapter provided an analysis of the Liberian civil war and established poor 
governance, lack of democracy and inequalities as well as poverty and famine as among 
the factors that prolonged the civil war in Liberia.  In fact unlike in Angola where the 
                                                 
21 Report of the Interim Chairperson on Peace Process in Liberia, (Presented at the 94th Ordinary Session of the AU, 
August 2003), Document: Central Organ/MEC/AMB/3. (XCIV)  
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regime was always under the same political party, Liberia’s political and socio-economic 
inequalities and unbalanced distribution of wealth remained the same under various 
opposing regimes. The swearing in of a true democrat, Sirleaf-Johnson and the positive 
changes she has brought into Liberia now appear to be bearing fruit for the country. 
Liberia is now focusing on peace-keeping building efforts.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Sierra Leone Civil War 
 
 Sierra Leone was first established as a settlement for freed slaves in 1787 and 
became Africa’s first model state. In 1896 the country was declared a British protectorate. 
With a population of slightly below six million inhabitants dominated by the Temne in 
the north and the Mende in the South, Sierra Leone has huge deposits of valuable 
diamonds and other natural resources such as gold and timber. The country became 
independent in April 1961 under its first President Milton Margia of the Sierra Leone 
People's Party (SLLP). Various authors on the subject of the Sierra Leone civil war 
provide a picture of a successful Sierra Leone in the 1960s. According to Shola Omotola 
Sierra Leone had an independent and progressive civil service, judiciary and the military.1 
Prior to and after independence, roads, clinics and hospitals and new schools were built. 
The first ever university in the sub-Saharan region was Forrah Bay located in Freetown, 
the capital of Sierra Leone. Ndumbe supports this by stating that until 1970, Sierra Leone 
had one of the best public sector structures with professionally trained public sector 
employees.2 
 The direct involvement of the military in the political affairs of Sierra Leone in 
1967 was a pivotal moment in the history of Sierra Leone. A coup prevented an elected 
Siaka Stevens of All People's Congress (APC) from claiming his position as President of 
                                                 
1 Shola Omotola, “The Sierra Leone Lome Peace Accord,” Conflict Trends, issue 3, 2007, p. 38. 
2 J. Anyo Ndumbe, “Diamonds, Ethnicity and Power: The Case of Sierra Leone,’’ Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 12, 
no. 4, 2001,p. 90.  
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Sierra Leone. Thus in 1968, a counter coup restored Stevens but unfortunately, the 
President declared a one-party state system under authoritarian leadership.3  
 By the time Major General Saidu Momoh ascended to power in 1985, Stevens' 
corruption and mismanagement of the economy had dragged the country to a state of 
collapse- with no linkages between industry and the country's economy. Momoh’s 
attempt to restore economic growth by putting measures in place to curtail diamond 
smuggling in Sierra Leone “provoked a dangerous opposition” as the measures he 
adopted encroached on the business interests of those involved in the diamond industry, 
including foreign business people and former President Siaka Stevens himself.4 Momoh's 
regime therefore could not contain the ungovernable situation in the country. 
 In 1991 the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Corporal Foray Sankoh and 
with the support of Dictator Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL), 
forcefully gained control of the hinterlands in Eastern and Southern parts of Sierra Leone 
and imposed a new regime, the National Ruling Council (NPRC).5  The ensuing civil war 
endured for a period of 11 years leaving 50, 000 dead and 700, 000 displaced. 
 The prolonged war in Sierra Leone can be attributed to a combination of different 
factors which include poor governance and the absence of democracy which ushered in 
an unbalanced distribution of wealth. Local and foreign business interest alike in the 
diamond industry of Sierra Leone also exacerbated and prolonged the civil war in that 
country.  
                                                 
3  Shola Omotola, The Sierra Leone Lome Peace Accord, p. 38.  
4 David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2005), p. 33. 
5 Ibrahim  Abdulla, “Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra 
Leone, ” The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 203-235. 
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  Corruption, poor governance, lack of democracy 
 Corruption and poor governance in Sierra Leone cannot escape the mind of any 
researcher who attempts to examine the civil war in that country. The report of Truth and 
Reconciliation (TRC) in Sierra Leone is very elaborate on the impact of poor governance 
and lack of democracy on the people of Sierra Leone. Those who provided evidence to 
the TRC are reported to have expressed the view that the civil war in Sierra Leone was 
largely a result of failures in governance and institutional processes.6 The conclusion of 
the Steering Committee of the TRC stresses that this unsound governance provided a 
conducive environment for interplay of poverty, marginalization, greed and grievances 
that both caused and sustained the conflict and that in order to effectively deal with the 
problems of Sierra Leone, ensuring good governance is of paramount importance.  
 Examples of poor governance in Sierra Leone include the lack of political 
tolerance which eventually led to the abolition of opposition parties during the era of Dr. 
Siaka Stephens in 1978. Although Stephens took the responsibility of abolishing 
opposition, his predecessors, Sir Milton Margai and Sir Albert Margai, were not any 
better. They had created duality of the administration and judicial structures which made 
the system vulnerable to manipulation and as such took advantage of the weak structure 
and manipulated the system for their own selfish benefits.7 The Judiciary was not 
independent as it was subordinated to the Executive, which essentially diminished the 
power of the courts. Non-state actors such as the media were also suppressed and did not 
have the liberty to ensure accountability of both officials and private persons or even 
                                                 
6 Republic of Sierra Leone, Witness to Truth: Report of Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” vol. 2  
(Graphic Packaging: Accra, 2004), p. 7. 
7 Report of the Truth and Reconciliation, ibid, p. 8.  
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question business dealings in the country. Certainly the lack of democracy, excessive 
corruption and poor governance perpetuated the unequal distribution of Sierra Leone's 
mineral wealth and economic disempowerment of the majority including the youth. 
Ndumbe maintains that financial management, favoritism and nepotism, gross 
inefficiencies and excessive corruption limited the ability of government to deal with 
problems that beset the country.8 As a result of this, frustrations felt by the population 
eventually led to a series of strikes and coups.   
 The weak statehood and weak institutions of the successive regimes and the 
involvement of the military in the political system exacerbated the multifaceted 
challenges in Sierra Leone of accountability and transparency in the economic affairs of 
the country surely brought Sierra Leone to its knees. Such lack of accountability which is 
evident in any corrupt country is a good recipe for the continued struggle of those that 
feel alienated by those in power. This eventually played a major role in fueling the civil 
war and perpetuated the persistent radical and brutal opposition across in Sierra Leone.  
Poor governance and corruption meant that most of the people in Sierra Leone were 
deliberately deprived of the rights to benefit from their country’s wealth. It therefore 
became impossible for the population, including civil servants and the military, to trust 
the leadership and government of their country.  David Keen asserts that this lack of trust 
led to the disenchanted people defecting from bad governance to join rebel movements. 
The RUF rebel movement at that point in time offered the population an alternative as it 
vowed to fight corruption and promote equality and free education. As a result RUF 
attracted much of the disgruntled population.9 
                                                 
8 J. Anyo Ndumbe, Diamonds, Ethnicity and Power: The Case of Sierra Leone, p. 91.  
9  David Keen, Conflict and Collusion, (New York: Palgrave, 2005), p. 40. 
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 Poverty 
The excessive inequalities in Sierra Leone were a recipe for civil unrest and grievances. 
The peasantry class who were most affected by the state of affairs in Sierra Leone found 
it fit to join the RUF. And, indeed, the brutality displayed by RUF militants was hugely 
supported by the frustrated masses who were poverty stricken and resented successive 
corrupt regimes. Greg Campbell, for example, argues that RUF began as a movement of 
peasants who were obviously distressed about the inequalities that existed in Sierra Leone 
at the time.10 The assertion by Campbell correlates with the findings of David Keen who 
argues that social exclusion of citizens has the potential to negatively impact the values 
and emotions of populations.11 Indeed, Ibrahim Abdullah confirms that RUF recruited 
from the vulnerable “lumpens and juveniles to whom their bush paths to destruction 
appeared more appealing.”12  
Furthermore, when Stephens decided to bring the mining industry under one 
organization and required the cleanup of smuggling in the mining fields, the miners who 
in most cases were the youth lost their wages and began to feel deprived of basic needs – 
poverty.13  The economy also plummeted resulting in lower salaries which led the 
educated, including teachers across the country to leave the work place and become idle. 
Quoting Fouke Mpoyo, Conteh-Morgan highlights that “many Sierra Leoneans believe 
that unemployment caused many hardships that later produced rebellion and exacerbated 
                                                 
10 Greg Campbell, Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World’s Most Precious Stones,  
    (New York: Westview Press, 2002), p. 42. 
11 David Keen, Conflict and Collusion, ibid.  
12 Ibrahim Abdullah, Ibrahim Abdulla, “Bush Path to Destruction, p. 39.  
13 Earl Conteh-Morgan, “Globalization, State Failure and Collective Violence: The Case of Sierra Leone,” 
International Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 11, no. 2, 2006, p.98 -99.  
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it as well, as there was no creation of jobs or economic improvements during the course 
of the war;further, there was no food and there was massive unemployment such that 
even the educated had no jobs. 14 This situation resulted in many young and educated 
people joining the RUF probably because they had given up on the leadership and 
government. This anger, generated by the economic hardship and poverty which had 
formed over the years certainly offers an explanation for the heartless killings of those 
who had wealth.  
 Resources / diamond industry 
  Diamonds were discovered in Sierra Leone in 1930 in the Eastern Kono 
district and by 1970s, half of the output was exported illegally. The alluvial diamonds of 
Sierra Leone are on the surface and not entrenched in kimberlite. As such, they are easily 
accessible without requiring sophisticated and expensive technology to mine them.     
 It is evident that Stephens had a desire to control the diamond mining for personal 
gains and this brought Sierra Leone to its knees. His creation of a National Diamond 
Company under his office as Prime Minister and his entrusting of the company to his 
trusted friend, Lebanese businessman Jamil Mohammed complicated matters for the 
country as the duo pushed for their personal business interests.  Steven’s successor 
Joseph Momoh worsened the situation further as he gave Mohammed even more powers 
over the mining sector, a move which indeed undermined the Sierra Leone people.  
 It was during this period of excessive corruption and mismanagement in the 
diamond mining in Sierra Leone that the people of Sierra Leone ended up in what came 
to be viewed in many quarters as the diamond war. The accounts of Davies show that 
                                                 
14 Earl Conteh-Morgan, “Globalization, State Failure and Collective Violence: The Case of Sierra Leone,”p.100.  
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Sierra Leone produced 2 million carats between 1960 and 1970 and that during that time 
at least half of the diamond output was exported illegally. Ndumbe’s work correlates with 
the findings of Davies, indicating that by the 1970s, legal trade in diamonds dropped 
from 2 million carats to 595 000 in 1980 and further dropped to 48 000 carats in 1988.15 
Davies further postulates that the exploitation policies by the successive regimes 
encouraged crime – the illicit mining and smuggling which resulted in the emergence of 
desperate miners known as the san-san boys. Ndumbe expresses similar sentiments to 
Davies’ statement that poor policies led to mismanagement of diamond exploration 
activities. This no doubt precipitated the acrimony in the country as a race for access to 
diamonds by officials, rebel groups and business people with malice became evident 
through the 1970s to the early 2000s when the war ended. 
 There are allegations that the RUF field commander General Mosquito joined the 
rebellion expecting to access diamonds.16 To buttress the extent of diamond influence in 
the country’s civil war Richards alleges that following the ECOMOG intervention in the 
civil war in 1998 the three main factions, CDF, AFRC and RUF fought using between 60 
000 and 80 000 combatants, which according to Richards represented a comparatively 
large number in view of the small population of about 4.5 million at the time. 17  While 
Richards is not explicitly convinced by assertions of some writers about the tremendous 
influence of the diamonds in the civil war in Sierra Leone, his findings are useful as they 
provide much information on the role of diamonds in the Sierra Leone civil war. For 
example he asserts that diamond mining helped to fund a rapid expansion of the CDF 
                                                 
15 J. Anyu Ndumbe, Diamonds, Ethnicity and Power, p. 92.  
16 Victor A.B. Davies, “War , Poverty and Growth in Africa: Lessons from Sierra Leone,” Paper prepared for Centre 
for the Study of African Economies 5th Annual Conference, St. Catherine’s College, March 18 – 19 2002, p. 8.  
17 Paul Richards, “The Political Economy of Internal Conflict in Sierra Leone,” Working Paper 21, Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations ‘Clingdael’ Conflict Research Unit, 2003, p. 22.  
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rebel movement which accordingly grew from “a few hundred combatants in 1996 to 
about 25 000 in 1998.”18  
 Both writers provide an indication that RUF illegally exported diamonds worth 
between $20 – 60 million per annum, although Richards suggests that the amount is 
insignificant. It is necessary to point out that that the assessment of whether or not this 
amount is significant is relative and depends on where one stands. For an African 
movement where there is lack and famine and deprivation, this no doubt is a significant 
amount. And, for a rebel who did not have a salary or was underpaid, being paid for 
smuggling diamonds would become a necessity. Davies further confirms that diamonds 
produced a war prolonging congruence of interests among the belligerents such that they 
at times mined peaceably side by side and attacked civilians with the intent of keeping 
them away from the lucrative industry.19 
 During the civil war diamonds sold in the black market emanating from RUF 
made up approximately ten percent of legitimate diamonds.20 Though illegitimate, they 
entered the market disguised as Liberian and Guinean. To state the obvious, illicit 
diamonds are cheaper and for both local and foreign businesses this cheaper and lucrative 
market becomes necessary for large profits. The corrupt officials, rebels and ordinary 
business people were all interested in having a share of the cheaper product which 
frustrated any hope for peace. Richards informs of a memo by the first General of the UN 
Peace Keeping operation in Sierra Leone who wrote complaining about the conduct of 
                                                 
18 Paul Rechards, The Political Economy of Internal Conflict in Sierra Leone, Ibid. 
19 Victor Davies, War, Poverty and Growth in Africa: Lessons from Sierra Leone, p. 9.  
20 Rachel Stohl, “UN Imposes Diamond Ban on Sierra Leone,” Weekly Defense Monitor, vol. 4, issue no. 28, 2000, 
no page no.  
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some ECOMOG generals who also had a hand in the illicit diamond trading and were as 
such bribed by Sankoh to support his interest in standing for presidential elections. The 
fact that the Memo did not reach the UN and ended only as a draft may not necessarily 
mean that it was not true. In the practice of diplomacy the general could have been 
constrained by the political consequences of his statements. What is important is that 
such allegations reveal the  possibilities that peace keepers may at times be not as honest 
as one may wish, therefore requiring much scrutiny if indeed civil strife is to be truly 
ended. We have seen other forms of abuses by some members of peace-keeping forces in 
some parts of Africa including in the DRC. 
 All these factors plus the instabilities in Sierra Leone made the diamond industry 
more lucrative and attracted corrupt officials and rebels as well as foreign firms alike to 
engage in the illicit trade. The assertions of both Davies and Richards suggest that 
without the booming illegal business in diamonds, the rebel movements would probably 
have been weaker without support from those interested in the illicit trafficking of 
diamonds. Thus the ferocious appetite for the alluvial diamonds knew no boundaries as 
those involved would prefer the status quo in order to benefit from the illicit trade. 
 The TRC report further asserts that there were unilateral interventions by the 
governments of Nigeria, Liberia, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Libya, Ivory Coast and the 
United Kingdom – the former colony which had intervened for various reasons. 21   There 
were also mercenaries and business foreign firms that became entangled in the Sierra 
Leone civil war. At the height of the war diamond customers in the form of foreign firms 
such as those from Australia, Switzerland, Tel Aviv, United States, and Ukraine kept the 
                                                 
21 Report of Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, vol. 2, p. 13.  
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war going. The availability of foreign customers who also bought diamonds in foreign 
currency was an incentive for a continued war.   
 The involvement of Charles Taylor of Liberia in the civil war in Sierra Leone 
deserves mention when one considers the impact of external involvement in the civil war 
in Sierra Leone.  Charles Taylor had two primary motives in Sierra Leone, which were to 
retaliate against the Momoh regime for supporting the 1990 ECOMOG intervention in 
Liberia and secondly, indeed, the desire to obtain diamond resources to finance his 
insurgency and pay off his supporters against Liberian President, Samuel Doe.22 It was 
actually with the help of Charles Taylor of Liberia that RUF invaded Sierra Leone and 
launched attacks against the government. It was through Taylor that RUF was able to sell 
its blood diamonds using Liberia as transit country. In turn the profits provided the RUF 
with the opportunity to purchase arms and ammunitions on the black market in Liberia 
and sustain years of war against Government.  
 During the Sierra Leone civil war, the controls and regulations for the diamond 
trade were lax. The “Diamond High Council in Antwerp used to record the origins of 
diamond imports as the last country to ship the goods  meaning that the RUF diamonds 
shipped from Monrovia were falsely identified as originating from Liberia and as such 
were  imported into the legitimate markets of Antwerp in Belgium, Israel and Ukraine 
among others.23  It was this loophole which ensured profits for Charles Taylor's Liberia 
and RUF and in this regard prolonged the war. Campbell argues that the loophole was 
deliberately crafted for business reasons.24 In 2000, a Canadian based NGO blamed the 
                                                 
22Earl Conteh-Morgan, Globalization, State Failure and Collective Violence, p. 100.  
23 Rachel Stohl, “UN Imposes Diamond Ban on Sierra Leone, no page number. 
24 Greg Campbell, Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World’s Most Precious Stones, p. 23.  
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Belgian industry for deliberately attracting organized crime and therefore for complicity 
in fueling the wars in Africa.25 This NGO initiative marked the beginning of an 
international campaign against blood diamonds. The campaign led to the creation of the 
Kimberly Process Certification Scheme – a voluntary process in which rough diamonds 
are certified to distinguish legal ones from those that are illicit.  
 As a result of the continued demand for Sierra Leone’s illicit diamonds in 
Antwerp and other countries, in 2000 the United Nations Security Council unanimously 
adopted resolution 1306, instituting an 18 months embargo on the trading of Sierra 
Leone's rough diamonds and instructed Antwerp to identify legitimate diamonds by the 
place where they are mined.26  The resolution also requested the International Diamond 
Manufacturers Association, the World Federation of Diamond Bourses and the Diamond 
High Council to improve transparency of international diamond trade.  
 In this chapter I have attempted to prove that, the multiple effects of greed and 
grievances, denial of human basic needs to the majority of the people, poor governance 
and the inherent institutional weaknesses in Sierra Leone, external interference of 
Taylor’s regime and other governments and the mercenaries emanating from foreign 
countries mostly interested in accessing the diamond fields, all played a crucial role in 
prolonging the conflict in that country.  
 
 
                                                 
25David  Keen, Conflict and Collusion , p. 269 
26 Security Council Resolution, “The Situation in Sierra Leone,” S/RES/1306, 2000, pp. 1-2.  
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CHAPTER 7  
 
   CONFLICT PREVENTION  
 
 
This thesis has from the onset provided an in-depth analysis of multiplicities of 
factors that prolong conflict on the continent of Africa. The cases of Angola, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone show that the issues of poor governance, lack of democracy and poor 
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institutions that fail to respond to the needs of people played a role in prolonging civil 
conflict in the three countries. Under such poor circumstances, the basic needs of people 
were unmet – a situation which often exacerbated frustrations that precipitate civil strife. 
It is also very clear in all the three cases that economic interests, greed and the desire to 
control natural resources especially diamonds for personal gains contributed to 
prolonging the civil conflicts in these countries.  There is evidence of maladministration 
and mismanagement of national resources and corruption was rampant which led to 
inequalities throughout the three countries. As a result of the inequalities and unbalanced 
distribution of the countries’ national wealth the majority of the people were left deprived 
under poor living conditions. Those deprived indeed struggled against their oppressors.  
The thesis also established that minerals, especially diamonds also attracted 
international businesses, MNCs and foreign governments which were solely interested in 
pushing their economic interests through the illegal trade in diamonds, without much 
interest in promoting peace and stability in those countries.  Most of the interventions in 
the three civil conflicts were not based in good faith but greed and wealth.  
It is not adequate to simply elaborate the multiple factors that prolong conflict 
without proposing some best mechanisms that can meaningfully help in either the 
prevention or resolution of conflict in Africa. This chapter therefore proposes that 
preventing civil conflict is better than curing it and attempts to offer the best possible 
ways in which civil conflict in Africa can meaningfully be prevented. The chapter 
surveys the two main categories of conflict prevention namely, operational and structural 
prevention, and posits that structural prevention of conflict is the best preventive measure 
against civil conflict. As such the chapter claims that governments that are accountable to 
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their citizenry and adopt a combination of models that promote democracy, good 
governance, social inclusiveness, and sound economic equity, and fairly provide for the 
basic needs of their peoples have a fairly good chance to sustain political stability and 
thereby diffuse any possible tensions that can otherwise escalate into civil unrest.  
The Chapter uses the example of Botswana – where there has never been a civil 
war, as a model country where structural prevention has been effective, while 
acknowledging that prevention does not necessarily guarantee peace and stability and that 
erosion of the principles, where they exist, can lead to the outbreak of hostilities even in 
the most stable countries as we have seen in the cases of Kenya and Zimbabwe.   
Why conflict prevention 
The need to prevent conflict does not only arise for the sake of peace, stability and 
prosperity of nations, but also because the people have inalienable rights to dignity. They 
have the right to exist and fully exploit their potential. They have the right to good health, 
safe drinking water, and the right to freely express themselves. In addition, prevention is 
better than cure because the consequences of wars are unbearable where they have 
occurred. The loss of property, loss of life on an unimaginable scale, socio-economic and 
political disruptions are among the deadly cost and most immediate consequences of civil 
war.  
The Carnegie Commission report on Preventing Deadly Conflict categorises 
strategies for preventing conflict into two: operational prevention, which refers to 
measures applicable in the face of immediate crisis, and structural prevention which 
consists of measures to ensure that crises do not arise in the first place or, if they do, that 
they do not recur.  
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Structural prevention 
In this scenario the potential for deadly conflict is prevented by establishing states 
premised on democracy and the rule of law with widely available economic opportunity, 
social safety nets, protection of fundamental human rights, and robust civil societies.
 The Carnegie report further maintains whatever form of self government, non-
violent efforts which include security, well being and justice which improve the lives of 
people reduce the potential for deadly conflict.”1 The structural prevention occurs at the 
formation of a state or at the peace building level and the overarching goal is an attempt 
to prevent war from happening in the first place or in the case of countries emerging from 
conflict and therefore at peace-building level, structural prevention mechanism attempts 
to prevent a recurrence of civil conflict .  
Operational Prevention 
Operational prevention applies when war appears imminent. In such a situation 
early engagement by an international organization, diplomatic intervention, and military 
intervention may be imperative to suppress insurgency. However, according to the 
Carnegie report, the proposed engagement can actually worsen the situation leading to 
the breakout of fully fledged civil conflict.2  Against this background, structural 
prevention is therefore a better model that may be helpful.  
 Expressions for conflict prevention by the United Nations 
The 21st century ushered in a new era in which countries began to put emphasis 
on prevention of conflict rather than cure. This was mainly because the international 
                                                 
1 Report of the Carnegie Commission, “Preventing Deadly Conflict,” (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1997), p. 
xviii.  
  
2 Report of the Carnegie Commission, ibid.  
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community had come to realize the cost of peace keeping operations of the United 
Nations. In addition, regardless of efforts by the United Nations and the international 
community at large, to end civil conflict, the absence of political commitment by parties 
involved made peace impossible regardless of the amount of troops deployed. Thus, at 
the dawn of the Millennium, the international community adopted three reports 
supporting prevention rather than cure. These reports came to reshape the world view on 
matters of international peace and security. The 2000 Millennium Report which was 
adopted by the General Assembly at the end of 2000 states that there is near-universal 
agreement that prevention is preferable to cure, and the strategies for prevention should 
foremost address the root causes of conflict. 3 The strategies alluded to in this ground 
breaking report point to issues of democracy, governance and equality - that the 
promotion of “human rights, to protect minority rights and to institute political 
arrangements in which all groups are represented. Every group needs to become 
convinced that the state belongs to all people.4 
In yet another UN report former Secretary General Kofi Annan raises concern 
over the enormous human costs of not preventing violence. This cost goes “beyond the 
visible and immediate consequences which include death, injury, destruction, 
displacement, but also the distant and indirect repercussion for families, communities, 
local and national institutions and economies, and neighbouring countries.5 A glaring 
example is that of the Rwanda genocide which according to the report could have been 
                                                 
3 Millennium Report, “We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century,” A/54/2000, 2000), pp. 
44 – 45. 
Online at http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_The_Peoples.pdf 
4 Millennium Report, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, ibid.  
      
5 Report of the UN Secretary General, “Prevention of Armed Conflict,” A/55/985 – S/2001/374, 2001, p. 7.  
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prevented. In arguing for the prevention of conflict, it is asserted here that effective 
conflict prevention is a prerequisite for achieving and maintaining sustainable peace, 
which in turn is a pre-requisite for sustainable development and not the other way round. 
Kofi Annan argues that the long-term structural prevention of conflict is the ultimate 
investment in sustainable development for the reason that sustainable development 
cannot take place in the midst of actual or potential conflict, and second, because armed 
conflict destroys the achievements of national development.6  
The findings of the Brahimi report of 2000 indicate that prevention is by far more 
preferable for those who would otherwise suffer the consequences of war, and that 
prevention is actually less costly for the international community than military action, 
emergency humanitarian relief or reconstruction after a war.7 The report puts emphasis 
on the rule of war, respect for human rights, and helping communities emerging from 
conflict to reconcile.  This long term preventive measures proposed by Annan include the 
promotion of human rights, protection of minority rights and the institution of “political 
arrangements in which all groups are represented. Every group needs to become 
convinced that the state belongs to all people. 8 
The Case of Botswana 
Admittedly, circumstances of countries differ and there is no particular equation 
for the prevention of conflict as the Secretary General points out in his report.  The 
purpose of using Botswana here is not to claim that the country is perfect in any shape or 
form because in any case there is no country that should claim to be perfect. Indeed there 
is a lot of work that has been done pointing to the country’s imperfections. The fact 
                                                 
6 Report of the Secretary General, Prevention of Armed Conflict, ibid, p.8.  
7 Brahimi Report, “Report of the Panel on UN Peace Keeping Operations,”A/55/305 –S/2000/809, 2000, pp. 5-6.  
8 The Brahimi Report, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Keeping Operations, pp. 5 – 6.  
73 
 
however, remains: Botswana has been comparatively stable throughout its history, 
despite the country’s ethnically heterogeneous nature and despite the discovery of 
diamonds in 1967, which catapulted the country from one the poorest countries in the 
world at independence to an Upper Middle Income Country.9 Botswana’s solid record is 
not sheer luck; it is the result of committed and accountable leadership. And therefore the 
country’s track record demonstrates that choosing the route of   structural prevention of 
conflict at the formation of a state stands a better chance in preventing the outbreak of 
hostilities that may potentially lead to outbreak of wars as has happened in many 
countries in Africa. This structural preventive method that Botswana deployed since its 
independence has held the nation together and played a huge role in sustaining peace and 
stability as well as sustainable development in the small nation.  
 
 
 
Political factors 
Democracy, governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights 
Botswana gained its independence from Britain in 1966 and was founded under a 
multiparty state system and has held legitimate elections consistently since then.  At the 
creation of the nation, the people of Botswana (then Bechuanaland) agreed on four basic 
pillars as the cornerstones of the new Republic, democracy, development, unity and self-
reliance. These principles have served the country well over the years.  To date Botswana 
                                                 
9 World Bank Report, “Botswana,” 2013, p. 1. 
Online at: http://data.worldbank.org/country/botswana 
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is one of the few countries on the continent that has never experienced actual disruption 
of democracy and civil strife.  
Research shows that Botswana has a good record in terms of respect for human 
rights, the rule of law, and government fairness and honesty and that the constitution 
guarantees an equal opportunity to petition the courts and the government for redress of 
wrongs.10 It is in this regard that Botswana is recognised as a long standing democracy in 
Africa and has for many years been tagged a shining example of democracy on the 
continent. This is also supported by Throup who, in surveying Botswana’s political 
environment, posits that the country has a unique record in Africa as a multiparty 
democracy and that the country has been judged by Transparency International as the 
least corrupt country on the continent. Throup further adds that the government has 
consistently respected the rule of law and individual liberties and that the media is high 
quality.11 Former President of Botswana and one of the founding fathers of the nation, 
Ketumile Masire explains in his memoires that he and the late Sir Seretse Khama, first 
president of Botswana, had the objective of building a unified nation and creating a 
society that was non-racial and non-tribal once the British granted the country its 
independence.12 It is because of this visionary leadership of Masire and the first 
president, Sir Seretse Khama and others that the laws and policies that were adopted 
promoted and protected the rights of all citizens regardless of “race, place of origin, 
political opinions, colour, creed or sex” and as a result the people of the country have for 
                                                 
10 “Accountability and Transparency: Country Studies – Botswana,” Democracy Web 
     Online at http://www.democracyweb.org/accountability/botswana.php  
11 David W. Throup, “Botswana: Assessing Risks to Stability,” A Report of the CSIS Africa Programme, June 2011,  
    p. 5. 
12 Q.K.J.  Masire, Very Brave or Very Foolish? Memoirs of and African Democrat, (Gaborone: McMillan Botswana 
Publishing, 2006), p. 33.  
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many years not had a reason to actually revolt against the leadership.13 Indeed out of the 
seven pillars of Botswana’s Vision 2016, three put emphasis on creating an open, 
democratic and accountable nation, a moral and tolerant nation and, united and proud 
nation. 
Governance 
Governance is innate in the people of Botswana (Batswana) and was long 
exercised from time immemorial through a traditional system known as the kgotla. The 
kgotla is a traditional forum for consultations. Under this system of consultations, the 
elders of a community gather for announcements, to formulate a policy, decide on 
matters affecting society, “including political and economic developmental activities and 
litigations.”14 
According to Masire, kgotla played various roles, including the court of law, 
Parliament and administrative body, where people also sought justice. The system of 
kgotla was maintained in the modern Botswana and has served the country positively by 
deepening democracy.15 Practically each village has a kgotla. The relevance of kgotla is 
that politicians still use it as a way of the consulting communities on matters that affect 
the country. It is through kgotla that the leaders of the country, including presidents also 
exchange views with communities on government programmes and developments in the 
country. Moumakwa concludes that the kgotla system is a traditional institution has 
stabilized peace and social unity among the rural and urban communities in Botswana16. 
                                                 
13 The Botswana Constitution, Section 3.  
14 Piwane C. Moumakwa “The Botswana Kgotla System: A mechanism for Traditional Conflict Resolution in 
modern Botswana,” Master’s Thesis in Philosophy of Peace and Conflict Transformation, 2010, p. 3.   
 
15 Q. k. J. Masire, Very Brave or Foolish, p. 62. 
16Piwane C. Moumakwa, The Botswana Kgotla System, p.80.  
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This process therefore ensures transparency and inclusivity and ownership of 
programmes by locals, and its optimal utilisation can potentially deepen democracy. In 
addition to the kgotla system several institutions such the Directorate of Corruption and 
Economic Crime, Ombudsman and so on were established in order to strengthen 
governance in the country. Indeed there has been criticism that the institutions are 
toothless particularly because they report to the Presidency. As such there are views that 
this was diminishing the independence of the institutions. Notwithstanding this criticism, 
it is important to take into consideration that the DCEC has played a significant role in 
exposing corruption in the country, including prosecuting high level officials. The 
strengthening of these institutions and their total independence are of great importance 
for further strengthening good governance in the country.  
Socio-economic factors 
Over the years Botswana developed from a least developed country at 
independence in 1966 to an upper middle income country. According to a UNICEF 
Report on Botswana this progress was due to “prudent use and management of mineral 
resources and a stable democratic governance system, with regular free and fair general 
elections.” Botswana is largest producer of diamonds by value. The prudent management 
of diamonds has led to the wealth that the country possesses today. Despite this wealth, 
Botswana has never had a civil war as evidenced in many countries in the region with 
diamonds. It is because of the diamond industry that Botswana became one of the most 
successful countries in Africa. Botswana was among the first countries to support the 
Kimberly Process and between 2006 and 2009 the country was among the countries that 
campaigned for diamonds for development, making it clear that not all diamonds of the 
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world were blood diamonds. This is so because of the prudent economic policies adopted 
by the country to embrace equal distribution of the country’s wealth. Sixty percent of 
government’s revenue is obtained from diamonds and this revenue has been used in the 
previous years to provide free education, free access to health facilities and so on. 
Although some reports point to high unemployment rates especially among the youth, 
inequalities and high levels of poverty, a complaint which has also been raised by 
opposition parties, the Government of Botswana has continued to put in place 
programmes that are aimed at alleviating the problems of unemployment and poverty.  
Policy documents, such as the National Development Plans, the long-term Vision 
2016 and the National Poverty Eradication Strategy are an expression of Botswana’s 
desire to reduce poverty in the country. A report of the Botswana Institute for 
Development and Policy Analysis (BIDPA) establishes a 3-pronged approach by 
government to reduce poverty, viz,  
Promotion of broad-based economic growth through the introduction of economic incentives for 
employment creation, income generation, and citizen economic empowerment and entrepreneurial 
development; investment in public infrastructure and social services to enhance human capability 
outcomes; adoption of SSNs to target the poor and vulnerable groups.’17  
The Botswana Vision 2016 itself articulates the necessity to create an educated 
nation and a prosperous one in order to empower citizens. Social safety nets for elderly 
people, orphans and the destitute have played a significant role in alleviating poverty in 
Botswana.  The aggressive response to poverty has ensured that the basic needs of people 
are generally met. For example, a UNDP Report on Botswana states that access to 
                                                 
17 Tebogo B. Seleka and, Happy Siphambe, et al, Social Safety Nets in Botswana: Administration, Targeting and 
Sustainability (Gaborone: Lightbooks, 2007), p. 7. 
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potable water and sanitation respectively stood at 95.8% and 79.8% of the population in 
2007 while an estimated 95% of the population having access to a health facility within a 
radius of 8km. The adult literacy ratio rose sharply since independence to 81% in 2003 
whilst primary school age children are virtually assured access to 10 years of basic 
education.18 The introduction of Special Constables in the country, in which youth who 
have completed High School but did not succeed in their examination are trained to assist 
the police in law enforcement across the country has helped in taking youth that could 
otherwise be delinquent out of the streets.  In addition, the government has reintroduced a 
national service programme, as Tirelo Sechaba. Through this programme, the youth that 
have completed their middle school and high school examination get involved in national 
service and are paid some fees for the job they do. In addition, the government introduced 
an Internship Program for graduates. Under this program graduates are employed for two 
years by both the civil service and private sector as trainees and the government itself is 
responsible for their pay.  
These programs have played a significant role in keeping many youth from the 
streets and have decreased the number of people living under the poverty datum line 
therefore reducing the levels of frustration that could lead to a total outbreak of 
hostilities. These programmes no doubt demonstrate commitment of the successive 
governments of the country to uplifting the lives of the people of Botswana in general. As 
a result of these efforts the percentage of people living below the poverty datum line 
steadily declined from 47% in 1993 to 30% in 2002, 23% in 2009.19 
                                                 
18 UNDP in Botswana, “Millennium Development Goals: About Botswana,” 2014, no page number. 
http://www.bw.undp.org/content/botswana/en/home/mdgoverview/overview/mdg1/ 
19 Report of UNDP in Botswana, “Millennium Development Goals: About Botswana,” 2014, no page number. 
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As already alluded to earlier in this thesis, civil strife and unrest start when the 
masses are dissatisfied with the leadership and by and large, when they feel deprived and 
do not have basic needs to sustain themselves. In many countries in Africa where there 
has been civil unrest, it was result of the absence of provision of basic needs, unbalanced 
policies, and lack of democracy, and excessive corruption which neglected the majority 
of the people. Examples include South Africa during apartheid era, Rwanda, Angola, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC and many other countries on the continent that have 
experienced prolonged civil wars.  The Potential for civil war in Zimbabwe and Kenya 
can be attributed to excessive corruption by the regimes in these countries and feelings of 
deep frustration.  
In a nutshell, this chapter has pointed out that African countries bear the primary 
responsibility of preventing civil conflict by adopting the legislation and laws that 
promote the aspirations of their people, promote democracy and good governance, 
accountability and respect for the rights of people in order to prevent the outbreak of 
hostilities. Establishment of these principles, particularly at the formation stages of a state 
and at the peace building level, in other words, the structural preventive methods, has the 
potential to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. Botswana is a good example, where 
structural preventive methods have been successful.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has examined the civil conflicts in Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone 
with the overarching goal of establishing factors that prolonged those conflicts, and ways 
in which civil conflict can be prevented on the continent. The paper recognized that the 
civil conflicts in these three countries added to the numbers of countries undergoing 
brutal civil strife on the continent. The thesis has established those political and socio-
81 
 
economic factors that have contributed to civil conflict in Africa, namely, the colonial 
factor, ideological war, ethnicity, lack of democracy and accountability, poor governance, 
neglect of the majority of the population, poverty and unmet human needs, greed  and 
external interference in the continent’s mineral industry.  
The analysis in this thesis is that there is not a single factor that causes or prolongs 
conflict, and that, multiplicity of factors interplay to prolong civil conflict. The thesis 
argues that of the factors outlined in the analysis, there are those that actually played a 
role in prolonging civil conflict while others were only short-lived. While colonialism, 
ethnicity and ideological wars played significant role in precipitating hostilities, the thesis 
elaborates that these factors could not have the prolonged civil conflict. Thus the thesis 
has argued that Latin America and Asia were colonized, however civil conflicts ended 
while many countries in Africa are actually still going through conflict. The ideological 
wars were also experienced across the globe, and despite the end of the cold war, many 
countries in Africa are still undergoing brutal civil conflict. In addition, the thesis also 
ruled out ethnicity as a factor that prolongs civil conflict in Africa. As stated by Gulshan 
Majeed, many countries even in the developed world are torn by ethnic strife, however 
that, as a result of their well organized systems, organized policies and proper   planning 
the industrialized countries are able to effectively contain ethnic tensions.1 
The proposal in this thesis is therefore that factors that accounted for the 
protracted civil wars in Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone were: internal and external 
economic interests in the natural resources of these countries, lack of democracy, poor 
governance, and excessive corruption that often leads to the neglect of the masses. Thus, 
                                                 
1 Gulshan Majeed, “Ethnicity and Conflict: A Theoretical Perspective,” Journal of Political Studies, vol. 2, issue 1, 
2013, p. 108.  
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common to these countries was the general neglect of the majority of people and their 
lack of basic human needs which played an explicit role in prolonging the civil conflicts 
in these countries. As elaborated, the people revolted because their governments could 
not achieve their aspirations. The majority of people were unemployed, poverty stricken 
and without basic needs.  
With this in mind, the thesis argued for prevention of conflict rather than cure. 
Prevention of conflict is not necessarily easy or cheap. It requires unequivocal 
commitment, dedication and political will. It requires resources. But, the cost of war itself 
and its deadly consequences – the loss of lives, total destruction, and abuse of human 
rights have remained immeasurable. The thesis therefore surveyed two methods of 
prevention of conflicts – the structural and operation prevention, where the former is 
deployed at the formation of a state to ensure that the hostilities do not get out of hand, 
and the latter is deployed when there is actual crisis. The thesis agrees with the structural 
prevention mechanism as an effective preventive measure compared to the operational 
model that is only deployed when there is actual crisis. The operational measure could 
come too late and worsen the situation, particularly when third parties such as the United 
Nations or a powerful country is engaged 
The case of Botswana was therefore used as a case to demonstrate the success of 
the structural prevention mechanism. Botswana began as a least developed country and 
has over the years developed to an Upper Middle Income Country as a result of the 
discovery of minerals, in particular diamonds. The discovery of diamonds did not lead to 
war as we have seen in the three cases in this thesis. Instead, the discovery of diamonds 
in Botswana and careful and wise management of the discovery brought wealth to the 
83 
 
country so that now it is arguably a   model for democracy in Africa. Botswana is also a 
multi-ethnic nation but again, this diversity has not led the country into a misfortune for 
the reason that the policies of the country have always promoted equality and equal 
access regardless of race, sex, creed or colour.  
The thesis concedes that Botswana is not a perfect country and acknowledges that 
there are challenges that the country is facing. The focus however, was not to interrogate 
the flaws of Botswana but rather, the practices that have held the country together and 
have ensured that the country remained politically and socio- economically stable in the 
face of the multifaceted challenges the country faces, for the past 47 years since 
independence.  The stern poverty eradication policies that have been embraced by the 
successive regimes, including the current, have promoted equal access to education and 
to health facilities and have supported economic development, and participation in 
political processes and decision making across the country. As a result of the good 
policies that the successive governments of Botswana adopted, the basic needs of the 
people are fairly met and the people have not had a very good reason to revolt to the 
extent that we have seen in the case of Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone and many 
countries that that have undergone civil conflict.  
.  The thesis establishes that peace and stability in Africa is the primary 
responsibility of the African people themselves. The international community can only 
meet the continent halfway. Interventions by third parties such as the United Nations or 
any organisation or country cannot be successful where there is an absence of 
commitment and dedication. What happened in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and what is 
currently happening in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and others can 
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only be attributed to the lack of commitment by the leadership, both governments and 
opposition.  It is therefore important that African governments and politicians create a 
good socio-economic and political environment by building strong institutions that guard 
the interests of the aspirations of their populations as opposed to greed and self interest. 
This should include establishing laws and policies that promote good governance, rule of 
law, human rights, equality and the welfare of the people.  
The lessons to be drawn from this thesis is that interventions by countries and 
intergovernmental organisations, aimed at peace keeping operations are usually not 
successful where there is little or no  foundation for democracy, good governance and 
equality and when people are not empowered and involved in decision making of their 
countries. Stability in African countries is fragile where there is little or absence of 
democracy, good governance, equality and where negligence of the masses is rampant. In 
such scenario threat of sliding back to civil wars or new wars emerging.  
It is however, important to point out that democracy, good governance, equality 
and so on do not necessarily guarantee peace and stability, neither does their absence 
necessarily lead to conflict. The cases of countries such as Zimbabwe and Kenya 
demonstrate that leaders can actually reverse key principles of democracy bringing them 
brink of civil strife. Democracy is therefore nurtured and should not be stagnant; it needs 
to be watered and to be fed. Botswana cannot therefore be complacent and rely on the 
glory of the past but should keep striving for better.  The case of Zambia show that the 
absence of democratic principles may not necessarily lead to conflict. Zambia was 
established under a one-party state system, however, this never led to the outbreak of a 
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civil war, but of course one-party state system has been passed by time and the current 
generations in sub-Sahara cannot accept it in today’s world.  
In addition to other limitations, this thesis also does not offer concrete advice for 
countries that may not have sufficient resources (as is the case with Botswana), for 
example, in a country where the population at large including its leaders is generally poor 
with no resources to harness. By and large, it was not possible to review all literature on 
civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa due to limited time and the program’s requirements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Accountability and Transparency: Country Studies – Botswana.” Democracy Web. 
http://www.democracyweb.org/accountability/botswana.php. Accessed February 15 2015. 
Abdulla, Ibrahim. 1998. “Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United 
Front/Sierra Leone.” The Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 36 (No. 2). 203-235. 
Ali, Taisier M.,and Matthews, Robert O. 1999. “Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution. 
 London: McGill-Queens’s University Press. 
 
Annan, Nancy. 2014. “Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges and    
Prospects,” International Journal of Security and Development, vol. 3 (No. 1). 
 
Ballah, Heneryatta et al. 2008. “Ethnicity, Politics and Social Conflict: The Quest for Peace in 
 Liberia,” in George Klay Kier, Jr., ed., The First Liberian War. New York:Peter Lang  
 Publishing. 
 
Barringer, Richard E. 1973. “War:Patterns of Conflict,” The Journal of Politics, vol 35 (No. 2): 526 – 528.  
 
86 
 
Blagojevic, Bojana. 2009. “Causes of Ethnic Conflict: A Conceptual Framework,” Journal of Global Governance, 
vol. 3 (No.1). 1-25. 
 
Brahimi Report. 2000. Report of the Panel on UN Peace Keeping Operations. Document. A/55/305 –S/2000/809. 
 
Burke,Marshall B. and Miguel, Edward, et al. 2009. “Warming Increased the Risk of Civil War 
in Africa.”  
 
Campbell, Greg. 2002. Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World’s Most Precious Stones: New York: 
Westview Press. 
 
Camegie Commission. 1997. Report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. New York: 
Carnegie Corporation.  
 
Chege, Michael. 2008.  “Kenya: Back from the Brink,” Journal for Democracy, vol. 19 (No.4): 125-139. 
 
Cilliers, Jackie. 2000. “Resource Wars, A New Type of Insurgency: The Role of Oil and Diamonds,” Institute for 
Security Studies.    
 
Collier, Paul.  2004. “Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: Crimes of War, War in Africa,” paper presented in 
Crimes of War Project, www.crimesofwar.org.  
 
Cohn, Theodore H. 2008. Global Political Economy. New York: Pearson Longman.  
 
Conteh-Morgan, Earl. 2008. “Globalization, State Failure and Collective Violence: The Case of Sierra Leone,” 
International Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 11 (No. 2). 98-100.  
 
Constitution of the Botswana. Amended in 2006. Gaborone.  
 
Costa, Danielle. 1998.  “The End of Cold War: Defensive or Offensive Realism?” paper presented at Tufts 
University, American Foreign Policy, 4 December. 
  
Davies, Victor A.B. 2002. “War, Poverty and Growth in Africa: Lessons from Sierra Leone,” Paper prepared for 
Centre for the Study of African Economies 5th Annual Conference, St. Catherine’s College, March 18 – 19.  
 
 Dietrich, Richard, “Ethical Considerations for Multinationals in Angola.”  
 
Draman, Rasheed. 2003. “Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship.” Paper presented for 
Experts Group Meeting on Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Program: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. May 19-
23. 
 
EAAF Annual Report. 2003. “Angola: Preliminary Mission to Kuito, Bie Province.”May 30. 
http:eaaf.typed.com/pdf/2003/Angola.pdf. 
 
Folker, Sterling.2008. “Making Sence of International Relations Theory.”BOULDER, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers Inc.13-38. 
  
Fruchart, Damien, and Holtom, Paul et al. 2007. “UN Embargoes, Their impact on arms flow and target behavior: A 
Case Study on Liberia, 1992-1996, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.  
 
Hagardon, Randall. 2010. “Biographical Memoir of Clifford Geertz: 23 August 1926 – 30 October,” Proceedings of 
American Philosophical Society, vol. 154, (No.1).  
  
 Henderson, Lawrence W. 1979. Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict. London: Cornel University Press.  
 
87 
 
Interim Chairperson. 2003. Report of the Interim Chairperson on Peace Process in Liberia. Presented at the 94th 
Ordinary Session of the AU, August. Document: Central Organ/MEC/AMB/3. 
 
 Keen, David. 2005. Conflict and Collusion, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone. New York: Palgrave Mcmillan. 
 
Kieh, George Jr. 2002. “Theories of Conflict and Conflict Resolution,” in George Kieh et al, ed., Zones of Conflict in 
Africa: Theories and Cases. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group.  
 
Konneh Augustine. 2002. “Understanding the Liberian Civil War.”Kieh. G, and Mukenge I. ed., “Zones of  
Conflict in Africa: Theories and Cases.” Portsmouth: Greenwood Publishing Group.  
Legwaila, Joseph Legwaila. 2006. “Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: Transforming A Peace Liability into a 
Peace Asset.”Paper presented in Egypt, Cairo, June 17-19.  
 
Luvhengo, Victor. 2006. Multinational Corporations and Human Rights Violations in African Conflict Zones: The 
Case Study of Angola 1992-2005,” A research report for Masters of Arts Degree in the Faculty, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. 
  
Majeed, Gulshan. 2013. “Ethnicity and Conflict: A Theoretical Perspective,” Journal of Political Studies, vol. 2 
(Issue 1). 97-111. 
 
Masire, Q.K.J.2006. Very Brave or Very Foolish? Memoirs of and African Democrat.  
Gaborone: McMillan Botswana Publishing.  
 
 Millennium Report. 2000. Report of the General Assembly on We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in 
the 21st Century. Document. A/54/2000. http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_The_Peoples.pdf. 
Accessed February 15 2015.  
 
Moumakwa Piwane C. 2010. “The Botswana Kgotla System:A mechanism for Traditional Conflict Resolution in 
modern Botswana,” Master’s Thesis in Philosophy of Peace and Conflict Transformation. 
Mulinge, Munyae M.  2008. “Botswana, Africa’s Haven of Ethnic Peace and Harmony: Status and Future 
Prospects,” African Journal of Sociology, vol. 4 (No.1). 61-85. 
 
Murshed, Mansoob. 2002. “Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment,” Journal of Peace Research vol.39 (No.4). 
387-393. 
 
Nass, I.A.2000.  “A Study in Internal Conflicts: the Liberian Crisis and the West Africa Peace Initiative.” 
 Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd.   
Ndumbe, Anyo J. 2001. “Diamonds, Ethnicity and Power: The Case of Sierra Leone.’’Mediterranean Quarterly, 
vol. 12 (No. 4). 
Nel and McGowan. (1999). Power, Wealth and Global Order: An International Relations Book for Africa. 
Capetown: University of Capetown Press.  
 Nyhamar, Tore. 1997. “Transitioning to Democratic Constitutions in Ethnic Conflicts: A Game Theoretic 
Analysis,” Peace and Conflict Studies: vol. 4 (No.2) Article 4. 
 
Olatubosun, Ajibogun. 2009.“Causes of Conflicts in the 21st Century Africa,” June. 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/16574808/Causes-of-Conflicts-in-21st-Century-Africa#scribd. Accessed December 20 
2014.  
 
88 
 
Opondo, Abiero. 2003. “Ethnicity: A Cause of Political Instability in Africa?” Paper presented at a lecture at Kigali 
Institute of Education, Rwanda. January. 
 
Ormerci, Ozan. 2010. “The Concept of Security and Security Studies.” Caspien Weekly. September 24. 
 
Oji, Ezinne C. 2004. “Child Soldiers in Liberia: History, Horror and Hope.” web.stabford.edu/class/e297a/civil wars 
in Africa.htm.  
 
Omotola, Shola. 2007. “The Sierra Leone Lome Peace Accord,” Conflict Trends. Issue 3. 
 
Osaghae, Eghosa and Robinson Gillian. 2005. “Introduction to Researching Conflict in Africa: Insights and 
Experiences,’’ Elizabeth Porter, ed. New York: United Nations University Press. 
 
Paglia, Pamela. No date.“Ethnicity and Tribalism: are these the Root Causes of the Sudanese Civil Conflict?”, 
African conflicts and the Role of Ethnicity: A Case Study of Sudan,  Africa Economic Analysis. 
 http:// www.africaeconomicanalysis.org 
  
Paul, Collier. 2004. “Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: Crimes of War, War in Africa.” Paper presented in 
Crimes of War Project. http://www.crimesofwar.org. 
 
Paulo, Manuel. 2004. “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process: From Military Peace to Social 
Justice?’’ Accord 15.  
 
Report of the Government of Liberia. 2008. Report on Poverty Reduction Strategy of the Republic of Liberia. April. 
 
Randall, Hagardon. 2010. “Biographical Memoir of Clifford Geertz: 23 August 1926 – 30 October 2006,” 
Proceedings of American Philosophical Society. Vol. 154 (No.1). 
 
Richards, Paul. 2003. “The Political Economy of Internal Conflict in Sierra Leone.” Working Paper 21. Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations: Conflict Research Unit. 
 
Seleka, Tebogo B., and Siphambe Happy, et al. 2007. Social Safety Nets in Botswana: Administration, Targeting 
and Sustainability. Gaborone: Lightbooks, 2007.  
 
Shipping, Tang. 2010. A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism. New York: Palgrave-
McMillan.150-151. 
Stephen Walt. 1998.  “International Relations: One World, Many Theories”, Foreign Policy, no.10.  
 
Stohl, Rachel. 2000. “UN Imposes Diamond Ban on Sierra Leone,” Weekly Defense Monitor, vol. 4 (No. 28. 
Tandon, Yash. 2000. “Root Causes of Peacelessness and Approach to Peace in Africa.” Journal of Peace Research. 
Vol. 25.  (Issue 2)166-187.   
The Economist.  2002. Jonas Savimbi. The Economist Print Edition. February 28.  
 
The Truth and Reconciliation of Liberia. 2008. Report of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the 
Preliminary Findings and Determinations.  Vol. 1. http://trcofliberia.org/resources/reports/final/volume-
one_layout-1.pdf. Accessed February 26 2015.  
The Truth and Reconciliation of Sierra Leone. 2004. Report of Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission  
on Witness to Truth. Vol. 2  (Graphic Packaging: Accra, 2004), p. 7. 
 
Throup David W. 2011. “Botswana: Assessing Risks to Stability.” A Report of the CSIS Africa Programme. June 
2011. 
89 
 
 
Tordoff, William. 1984. Government and Politics in Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
Stephen, Walt. 1998.  “International Relations: One World, Many Theories.” Foreign Policy. No.10. 
  
Tripoli Declaration. 2009. Declaration on the Elimination of Conflict in Africa and Promotion of Peace. Document: 
2009/SP/Assembly/PS/Decl.1. 
 
United Nations Development Programme in Botswana. 2014. Report on Millennium Development Goals: About 
Botswana. http://www.bw.undp.org/content/botswana/en/home/mdgoverview/overview/mdg1/. Accessed February 
26 2015.  
 
 
United Nations Mission in Liberia. 1997. Report on  United Nations Mission in Liberia, Background:1989-1997. 
 www.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/background.shtml. Accessed March 16 2010.  
 
United Nations Secretary General. 1998. Report of the Secretary General on The Causes of Conflict and the 
Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. 
 New York: United Nations. 
 
United Nations Secretary General. 2001. “Prevention of Armed Conflict.” Document: A/55/985 – S/2001/374..  
 
United Nations Secretary General. 2004. Report of Secretary General on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion 
of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. 
New York: United Nations. 
 
United Nations Security Council. 1993. Security Council Resolution on the Situation in Angola. Document S/Res 
865. New York: United Nations. 15 September.  
 
United Nations Security Council. 2000.  Security Council Resolution on the Situation in Sierra Leone. Document  
S/RES/1306. 
 
Vines, Alex. 2004.  “Angola: Forty Years of War,” in Peter Batchelor and Kees Kingma, ed., Demilitarisation and 
Peace Building in Southern Africa (Aldershot (etc):Ashgate, 2004): 74 – 104. 
 
Vogt Margaret A. 1999.  “Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity,”  
Monograph. No. 36.  
 
World Bank. 2013. Report on Botswana. http://data.worldbank.org/country/botswana. Accessed February 20 2015.  
 
Zartman, Willian. 1997. “Governance as a Conflict Management: Political Violence in West Africa.”  
Washington DC: The Brooking Institute.  
